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1 Introduction
Logic is an old subject, and since 1879 it has been a great one. (Quine, Methods
of Logic1.)
1879 is, of course, the year in which Frege’s Begriffsschrift ([15]) first appeared. Al-
though some have questioned the relative significance of the year 1879 for the development
of modern logic, the Begriffsschrift is clearly a landmark in the history of logic. Frege
was the first to introduce a formal language of truth-functional propositional logic and
higher-order quantification theory, which (modulo notational differences) is still in use
today. Moreover, he devises a calculus for this formal language, i.e. a system of syntac-
tically specified axioms and rules of inference, in which proofs can be represented and
assessed as to their validity. Again, axiomatic systems of formal logic such as Frege’s are
standard in modern logic. The propositional, as well as the first-order part of his Begriff-
sschrift calculus are sound and complete with respect to standard-semantics. Although
Frege never proved the latter (and, as we shall see shortly, according to some could not
prove for principled reasons), this shows Frege’s exceptionally good logical sense.
But Frege did not just devise a formal language and deductive system of higher-order
logic up to modern standards but also used it to prove things that hitherto were believed to
rest on substantial assumptions drawn from intuition. In particular he defined – within
his formal language – the ancestral of a given relation and proves its basic properties.
These results, together with Frege’s conviction that there is a major difference between
the truths of arithmetic and the truths of geometry, led him to pursue a program now
called “logicism”.2
The remaining task after the Begriffsschrift – to define in purely logical terms the num-
ber 0 and the successor-relation S – was subsequently met in his celebrated Grundlagen
der Arithmetik 1884 ([20]). By means of the ancestral of a given relation R, which Frege
had already defined in his Begriffsschrift, the natural numbers could then be defined as
1To be found in [48], p. vii. The quoted remark has been dropped in later editions.
2See Frege’s dissertation for the venia docendi in [21], p. 56, for Frege’s first articulation of the logicist thesis.
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those objects that follow 0 in the S-sequence.3 In his Grundlagen der Arithmetik, which,
according to Dummett is “Frege’s masterpiece, [...] his most powerful and most pregnant
piece of philosophical writing, composed when he was at the very height of his powers”4,
Frege reduced the problem of defining the number Zero and the successor-relation to the
problem of defining the number operator “the numbers of F ’s”.5 The last step in his
reduction of arithmetical concepts to (purportedly) purely logical concepts was taken in
his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (1893, [18]), where he introduced extensions of concepts
in order to define the number operator and proved Hume’s Principle, the basic principle
governing the number operator. In his Grundlagen Frege found extensions to be dispen-
sible6, but at the time of Grundgesetze he came to believe that they were necessary for
his logicist program of reducing arithmetic to logic.7
Although the system of his Grundgesetze turned out to be inconsistent, essentially due
to the introduction of extensions and Basic Law V, the only axiom governing extensions
(or “value-ranges” more general), the fact that he was the first to devise explicitly axioms
governing sets (or extensions), shouldn’t be underestimated.
Firstly, it provided the first step towards an increase of “truthfulness” with regards to
set-theoretic principles. It seems to me that Frege was right in claiming in the preface to
his Grundgesetze:
Ein Streit kann hierbei, soviel ich sehe, nur um mein Grundgesetz der Werthverla¨ufe
(V) entbrennen, das von den Logikern vielleicht noch nicht eigens ausgesprochen
ist, obwohl man danach denkt, z.B. wenn man von Begriffsumfa¨ngen redet.8
and, after receiving the letter from Russell, he was, for all intents and purposes, also
3The strong ancestral R< with respect to a given 2-place relation R can be defined in second-order logic by
R<xy :↔ ∀F ((∀u(Rxu → Fu) ∧ ∀u∀v(Fu ∧ Ruv → Fv)) → Fy). The weak ancestral R≤ is then defined by
R≤xy :↔ R<xy ∨ x = y. For a discussion of the formal achievements in Frege’s Begriffschrift see for instance [6].
4[13], p. 1
5The number 0 can be defined by Nu [x : x 6= x] and the successor-relation by Sxy ↔ ∃F∃z(Fz∧y = [u : Fu]∧
x = Nu [u : Fu ∧ u 6= z]. For a thorough discussion (including formal details) of Frege’s treatment of the natural
numbers see for instance [6] and [7]. An exposition including philosophical discussion can also be found in [13],
in particular chapters 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14.
6See [20], p. 80.
7[18] p. 449 (S. 253). The number in the brackets indicates the original page-number.
8[18] p. 4 (S. VII)
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right in his diagnosis in the appendix:
Solatium miseris, socios habuisse malorum. Dieser Trost, wenn es einer ist,
steht auch mir zur Seite; denn Alle, die von Begriffsumfa¨ngen, Klassen, Mengen
(footnote: Auch die Systeme des Herrn R. Dedekind geho¨ren hierher.) in ihren
Beweisen Gebrauch machen, sind in derselben Lage.9
He was just the only one to explicitly state the assumptions leading to inconsistency.10
Secondly, it mediately prompted the revision of informal set-theoretical reasoning ul-
timately leading to consistent axiomatizations of set-theory.
But Frege was not just the first to devise workable formal systems of higher-order
logic, but he was also interested in the semantics of this newly created systems. To this
end, Frege famously introduced – in his celebrated U¨ber Sinn und Bedeutung (1892) – the
distinction between sense and reference.11 Although the original purpose of introducing
this distinction was the rather narrow one of Frege’s felt need to revise certain stipulations
he made in his Begriffsschrift with regards to the relation of identity, it seems fair to say
that it also served the broader purpose of making explicit the built-in semantics of his
newly created formal language. And although in his U¨ber Sinn und Bedeutung, Frege
was for the most part interested in natural language, this interest seems to have been
motivated by Frege’s conviction that natural language has major shortcomings which had
to be remedied in order to devise a scientifically workable formal language. So getting a
clear picture of the intended semantics of his Begriffsschrift was necessary in order to get
a clear grasp of its intended applications.12
Another motive for his interest in semantics starting at the end of the 1880s might be
due to his awareness of its explanatory potential, as it might be called. The adoption of
a rule permitting the inference from φ(a) to ∃xφ(x) (“a” being some name) for instance,
might be explained by appeal to the stipulation according to which every name that occurs
within a language like his Begriffsschrift has to have a unique referent. Still more basic
9[18] p. 549 (S. 253)
10Note that Dedekind, as well as Hilbert explicitly concede that they had fallen prey to the same mistake. See
Hilbert’s letter to Frege in [19], p.80. For Dedekind and Zermelo see the discussion in [46], pp. 46-58.
11See [21], pp. 157-177.
12For instance, by Frege’s stipulations, non-referring terms or vague predicates are to be excluded from a
language that should be adequate for scientific purposes.
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are principles like the law of excluded middle, the adoption of which can be explained by
appeal to the two-valued semantics Frege had in mind in setting up the rules and axioms
of his formal language.
To sum up: Frege was the first to devise a workable formal language meeting modern
standards – in fact a formal language that in a way defined modern standards. Note
though, that Frege was not interested in developing a formal language just for the sake of
calculation, a purpose he often attributes to Boole and other logicians in the “algebraic
tradition”. Rather, he was interested in a language in which content could be expressed,
although with more presicion than can be done in natural language. As he puts it:
Boole wollte [...] eine Technik ausbilden, durch welche logische Aufgaben in sys-
tematischer Weise gelo¨st werden ko¨nnten, a¨hnlich wie die Algebra eine Technik
der Elimination und der Berechnung von Unbekannten lehrt. [...] Ich hatte von
vornherein den Ausdruck eines Inhaltes im Auge. Der Zielpunkt meiner Bestre-
bungen ist eine lingua characterica zuna¨chst fu¨r die Mathematik, nicht ein auf
reine Logik beschra¨nkter calculus. Der Inhalt aber soll genauer als durch die
Wortsprache wiedergegeben werden.13
The fact that Frege considered his Begriffsschrift as a lingua characterica, built upon
the model of natural language, has led many scholars to think that Frege was barred in
principle from certain investigations that have come to the fore in 20th century logic.
1.1 Metatheory
As we saw, the purpose of inventing a Begriffsschrift was to devise a language in which
content could be expressed more precisely than is possible in colloquial languages. Clearly,
the principle goal was to show rigorously that the truths of arithmetic are provable from
logical principles (together with definitions). But the invention of the Begriffsschrift
should not only serve the narrow purpose of helping to justify the logicist thesis, but
it was also meant to provide a framework in which, eventually, every part of scientific
discourse should have its place.14
13[22], p. 13
14In [15], p. XII for instance he writes: “Ich verspreche mir u¨berall da eine erfolgreiche Anwendung meiner
Begriffsschrift, wo ein besonderer Werth auf die Bu¨ndigkeit der Beweisfu¨hrung gelegt werden muss, wie bei8
Now, suppose we were given some particular part of scientific discourse, and we have
properly axiomatized it within the Begriffsschrift. That is, we have delineated some basic
concepts and we have chosen some truths about this part of discourse as axioms. Given
such a set of axioms and the laws of logic, we can now start to derive theorems from the
given set of axioms according to the rules specified by the Begriffsschrift. It then seems
entirely natural to ask questions like the following:
1. Are only truths of the given part of discourse derivable from the axioms? (In partic-
ular: Is it impossible to derive a contradiction from the axioms?)
2. Do the axioms suffice to derive every truth of the particular field in question?
3. Is the set of axioms minimal in the sense that no axiom can be derived from the
others?
4. Is the set of basic concepts minimal in the sense that no basic concept is definable
in terms of others?
Natural as these questions might seem, they are often not easy to answer. How can it
be shown, for instance, that every truth of a given part of science can be derived from
a given set of axioms for this part? Of course, as mortal beings that we are, it is not
possible to actually “look at every truth” of the field in question. And even if we could:
how can we come to know that a given truth is or is not derivable, if we haven’t found a
derivation yet? Maybe there is a proof but we just haven’t been able to find it yet.
Or take the even simpler question 1: how can we know that only truths are derivable
from a given set of axioms? One might of course argue that axioms are per definitionem
basic truths. Taking a quick look at the logical axioms and the rules of inference of,
say, those codified in the Begriffschrift will make it apparent that the axioms are true
(regardless of the specific content of the basic concepts of the given science) and that the
rules of inference are truth-preserving. That is, they always lead from true premises to
der Grundlegung der Differential- und Integralrechnung. Noch leichter scheint es mir zu sein, das Gebiet dieser
Formelsprache auf Geometrie auszudehnen. Es mu¨ssten nur fu¨r die hier vorkommenden anschaulichen Verha¨ltnisse
noch einige Zeichen eingefu¨gt werden. [...] Der Uebergang zu der reinen Bewegungslehre und weiter zur Mechanik
und Physik mo¨chte sich hier anschließen.”
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true conclusions. Hence, it might be argued, it is obvious that we can only prove truths,
for the axioms stated at the outset are true and the logical laws lead from truths to truths.
Now it is clear that the argument just given was not an argument within the science
under consideration. We took a step back and considered from the outside what can be
proved by means of the axioms of the given science and the logical principles codified in
the rules of the Begriffsschrift. Now, one of the questions that is at stake here is simply
this: was it possible for Frege to take this “step back” and argue just like we did? If so,
is this kind of argument to be counted as a genuine proof ? If not, can it be supplemented
or modified so as to count as a genuine proof? In short: Can questions of the sort 1 –
4 be adressed scientifically, i.e. within the bounds of a lingua characterica like Frege’s
Begriffsschrift?
According to an influential scholarly tradition (initiated by Van Heijenoorts seminal
paper Logic as Language vs. Logic as Calculus15), Frege was not just not interested in
such questions, but was in fact barred from even asking them in a way that permits an
answer that is subject to proof. This is said to follow from Frege’s universalist conception
of logic. In the indroductory note to Go¨del’s dissertation by Van Heijenoort and Dreben
we can read for instance this:
For Frege, and then for Russell and Whitehead, logic was universal: within each
explicit formulation of logic all deductive reasoning [...] was to be formalised.
Hence, not only was pure quantification theory never at the center of their
attention, but metasystematic questions as such, for example the question of
completeness, could not be meaningfully raised. [...] we have no vantage point
from which we can survey a given formalism as a whole, let alone look at logic
as a whole.16
Warren Goldfarb writes:
If the system [of logicism] constitutes the universal logical language, then there
can be no external standpoint from which one may view and discuss the system.
Metasystematic considerations are illegitimate rather than simply undesirable.17
15See [31].
16[23] p. 44.
17[25], p. 353 10
In Joan Weiner’s Frege in Perspective we can read this:
Frege’s view of the nature of logical laws precludes the existence of a substan-
tive metaperspective for logic [...] he would refuse to regard any metatheoretic
reasoning about primitive logical laws as expressing an objective inference.18
And Stewart Shapiro writes:
More important, perhaps, is the fact that metatheory and model-theoretic se-
mantics are foreign to logicism.19
This should suffice to give an impression of the view under consideration.20 It is hard
to pin it down more exactly, for it is notoriously vague, and there are of course variations
of the main theme. But the core of this point of view seems to lie in the following line of
reasoning, which might be called the Universality-Argument :
1. According to Frege the Begriffsschrift should be a universal language, that is, a
language in which every part of scientific reasoning should take place.
2. To step outside the Begriffsschrift is therefore leaving the realm of scientific justifi-
cation.
3. But metatheoretic questions force us to step outside the Begriffsschrift.
4. Hence, metatheoretic questions cannot be treated scientifically.
I admit that the matter is complex, and clearly more complex than this little argument
suggests, but I take it for granted that the view under consideration appeals to something
along the lines of this argument.
Now, as it stands, the argument does no seem to be sound in its (apparently) intended
generality. The reason is that the third premise is taken in far too much generality. It
is clearly false that “metatheoretic questions” in general necessitate a “step outside” the
18[65] p. 227.
19[59], p. 178
20Another prominent proponent of this view is Ricketts. See his [53]. For a more balanced account of Fregean
metatheory see [3], [60] and [55].
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logic of Begriffsschrift (or a language that would suffice as an adequate lingua character-
ica). In fact, quite the opposite seems to be the case in general. Metatheoretic questions
like completeness for instance arose by restricting attention to particular fragments of
what counted as “logic”, say the propositional or first-order fragment. Recall that, at
least until the 40’s, what belongs to “logic” was conceived of very broadly and was taken
to consist in something like type theory, even including an axiom of infinity and a sub-
stantial theory of classes.21 And this theory was of course taken by most logicians as a
fully interpreted “universal language”. So it would seem that most of the logicians of
the 20’s or 30’s, say, could not have raised any “metatheoretical questions”, for most of
them held the view that this kind of logic is “universal” in the sense that it is needed as
a “background-theory” for any kind of scientific investigation.
Hence, even if we admit that the argument given above would be cogent if properly
restricted, the range of its applicability would be severly limited: it would only pertain
to metatheoretic questions relating to the universal language as a whole. But again, the
most fruitful “metatheoretical questions” were raised concerning restricted parts of what
has been counted as “logic” and theories that were formulated within such restricted
parts. Examples for the former include the questions of soundness and completeness of
propositional logic or quantification theory (first-order logic). Examples of questions of
the latter kind are provided by axiomatizations of parts of mathematics like Euclidean
geometry or elementary arithmetic. It seems that there is no a priori reason (that is, a
reason based on the Universality-argument) that someone who believes in the universality
of logic is committed to a the view according to which metatheoretical investigations tout
court would be impossible.22
21It is for this reason that Hempel, even in the 40’s, could still claim that arithmetic could be reduced to “logic”.
See his [32].
22It should be mentioned that there is a least one passage in Frege’s writings where he seems to be concerned
with a decidedly metatheoretical question concerning his Begriffsschrift as a whole, namely in the famous §§ 29-31
of his Basic Laws. In these paragraphs, Frege apparently tries to prove that every expression that can be formed
by the primitives of his system has a unique reference. So if the proof were correct, Frege would have established
the consistency of his system, for – by uniqueness of reference – no sentence could be both true and false. (See
for instance [44], [30] or [43], 125 - 130.) Adherents of the view that, according to Frege, logic as a whole would
not be subject to scientific investigation, typically reject such passages as belonging to the realm of unscientific
“elucidations”. Although I will not pursue this line of thought here, it seems to me that the issue of metatheory12
This seems to suffice as a refutation of the global argument accordung to which Frege’s
“universalist view of logic” implies that no metatheory whatsoever would be possible. Still,
there might be specific reasons why a particular metatheoretic question might be ill-posed
from Frege’s perspective. This is in fact the approach I would recommend in investigating
Frege’s stance towards metatheory: to look case by case which kind of metatheoretic
questions were open for investigation – in principle – to Frege. In doing so one has to
be careful to avoid anachronism. The fact that Frege simply wasn’t interested in certain
questions, or that he might have done things differently than is done nowadays should not
lead us to draw significant conclusions about Frege’s conception of logic. Furthermore, it
is important to bear in mind that it is one thing to be able to pose certain questions but
still another one to assess their significance. Take for instance the completeness theorem
for first-order logic. That some given notion of derivability is provably coextensive with
the set-theoretically defined notion of semantic consequence is not in itself significant.
Rather the completeness theorem derives its significance from the felt priority of the
notion of semantic consequence. But it is not at all clear why this should be the case. A
major tradition in modern logic has it that it is quite the other way round. That is, it
takes it that the notion of logical consequence should be based on the notion of correct
inference rather than the set-theoretically defined notion of semantic consequence.23 It
has been doubted if the set-theoretically defined concept of consequence should even be
taken as explicating the notion of semantic consequence correctly.24
My point here is not to take sides in the discussion as to which notion of logical
consequence is “more basic”. The point is rather that sometimes it is simply a matter of
controversy as to the relative significance we ascribe to a particular metatheoretic result.
And that the importance we attribute to certain questions might be due to philosophical
considerations that do not prevent us from posing such questions.
pertaining even to logic as a whole is not that clear. It seems to me that attributing a view to Frege, according
to which such passages were unscientific, does no justice to Frege’s careful argumentation, for it clearly seems as
if he was trying to give something like an informal “proof”.
23See for instance [47].
24See [14] for an influential critique of the concept of semantic consequence.
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1.2 Semantics vs. Model-theory
There is another point which must be borne in mind in assessing Frege’s stance towards
metatheory. There is a salient tendency among adherents of the no-metatheory view to
conflate metatheory with semantic metatheory and semantic metatheory with modelthe-
oretic semantics.25 Approximatetely, metatheory (in a wide sense) can be said to be the
investigation of formal languages or theories by means of logico-mathematical methods.26
Obviously, nothing is thereby said about which aspect of the language or system in ques-
tion is to be studied. One might be interested in purely syntactical aspects of the language
in question, for instance if a particular string of signs is “producible” from a given set
of basic sequences and syntactical rules that allow us to transform these basic sequences.
In asking this kind of questions we are regarding the given formal language temporarily
as a mere game. But in doing so we are not committed to a view according to which
the formal language in question is nothing but a game, we just restrict our attention to
certain aspects of it.27
Metatheoretic questions of quite another kind are concerned with the intended seman-
tics of a given formal language. Say, one adopts a classical, two-valued semantics for a
given formal language. In adopting such a semantics, every sentence that can be formed
by means of the logical particles and the non-logical vocabulary of this language is as-
sumed to be either true or false. We can then ask, for instance, if every sentence of a
particular syntactic shape (say, every sentence of the form α → α) is true. Now, there
is no prima facie reason to believe that this sort of question has anything to do with
model-theoretic semantics. In particular, in posing such a question, one does not have to
invoke any notion of “truth in an interpretation” or something alike. The only devices
to formulate such a question is a means to specify certain subclasses of the wellformed
25To distinguish between the latter two is particularly important, for there is a clear sense of “semantic metathe-
ory”, which Frege would have endorsed (to which he was in fact committed, as I will argue in the second paper of
this dissertation), but which is quite different from modeltheoretic semantics.
26A narrower notion of “metatheory” is related to the distinction (bound up with Tarski) between object- and
metalanguage, which will concern us later on.
27Natural languages like German are clearly not “meaningless formalisms”. Still, there is no problem in re-
stricting attention to purely syntactical features of the german language. For Frege’s discussion of formalism and
the “game-metapher” see his Basic Laws Pt. II, §§ 90, 91 ([18], pp. 407-408).
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sentences and a predicate for truth simpliciter. One might argue that truth simpliciter
is just truth in the intended interpretation, but this seems to turn things upside down.
Of course, someone who thinks that model-theoretic semantics is the only way to do se-
mantics might identify truth simpliciter with truth in the intended interpretation.28 But
nothing forces us to do so! So the possibility of studying semantical relations without
being engaged in model-theory is not ruled out thereby.29
The discussion here is, again, not intended as to take sides in such a debate, but merely
to point to the fact that metatheoretical questions concerning semantics cannot simply
be equated with questions concerning modeltheoretic semantics. So even if something
in Frege’s conception of logic inherently forces him to reject model theory, there is no
reason to believe that he was precluded from enganging in semantic investigations, un-
derstood as the study of the relationship between a language (formal or otherwise) and
its intended intepretation (or to use a more neutral terminology: between a language and
what it is about). And in particular, there is no reason to think that this cannot be done
scientifically, that is, within the bounds, set out by, say, the Begriffsschrift.
Still, it is true that model-theory occupies a central place in 20th century logic. Some-
what quote-mining Vann McGee, one might even say: we need model-theory not just
semantics!30
Technically, the study of various models of axiomatic theories has turned out to be
extremely fruitful in various areas of mathematics. To name just some of the most promi-
nent examples: the investigation of models of axiomatic systems for first order-arithmetic
28From this perspective, “semantics” would be something like a subdiscipline of modeltheoretic semantics:
whereas modeltheoretic semantics is concerned with all interpretations of a given language, semantics would be
concerned only with questions relating to one particular interpretation, viz. the intended one. Of course, this
leaves the model-theorist with the problem of determining what is meant by the “intended interpretation” of a
theory.
29One might be inclined to doubt that the notion of truth simpliciter is in fact intelligible. This has been
doubted for instance by intuitionists (and other “anti-realists”) like Dummett, who believe that the semantic
value of a statement is bound to certain epistemic features. But the claim here is not that semantics can “in fact”
be done, but rather that there is no reason to believe that semantics can not be done without doing model-theoretic
semantics.
30[45] p. 569
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has become a major field of interest31 as well as the study of models of first-order the-
ories for the real numbers, even leading to a certain “rehabilitation” of infinitesimals.32
Model-theory also turned out to have a fruitful influence on abstract algebra.33 Hence,
if it could be shown that Frege didn’t grasp what model-theory is all about, it would be
shown thereby that he would be cut off from a major tradition of 20th century logico-
mathematical research.
It is often suggested that, in order to address certain metatheoretic questions con-
cerning axiomatic systems, a certain conception of axioms as reinterpretable schemes is
prerequisite. Surely there is more than a grain of truth in this. But one has to be cau-
tious here: in the context of the question at hand one has to bear in mind that only
because Frege (or any other pre-50’s researcher for that matter) might have done things
differently, this does not imply that he had no grasp of what modeltheoretic reasoning
amounts to. Also, one has to be careful not to make too great a deal of terminological
issues (in particular regarding the word “axiom”) in asking what kind of questions Frege
“could have” adressed.
As an example, consider the question of categoricity of a system of axioms. A system
of axioms is said to be categorical if any two of its models are identical from a structural
point of view, i.e.
(C) An axiomatic theory T is categorical iff there is an isomorphism between
any two of its models
It seems that if any question necessitates a genuine “model-theoretic point of view”, the
question of categoricity is one of the first candidates to consider, for models and structure-
preserving mappings between models are built into the very concept of categoricity. So if
any problem should be foreign to Frege, it should be this.
Now it is clear that Frege did not address the question of categoricity of systems of
axioms in this form. Frege clearly dismisses the notion of truth in a model/interpretation.
On Frege’s conception, a sentence of a language properly so called is inherently interpreted :
31See [38] for an extensive discussion of models of first-order Peano arithmetic.
32See [54] for the classical exposition of “Non-Standard Analysis”.
33See [37] for a modern (but not quite up-to date) presentation of model-theory and its main fields of application.
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it expresses a definite sense and is definitely either true or false.34 In particular, an
axiom expresses a definite thought and is true by fiat, for this is exactly what an axiom
is supposed to be: an unprovable, basic truth. So according to Frege, in considering
proper axioms (axioms “in the Euclidean sense”, as he sometimes calls them35) we are not
dealing with uninterpreted schemes, which only afterwards are being supplemented with
an interpretation (nor do we consider sentences as being capable of being re-interpreted),
but with meaningful propositions. So it seems that any question of categoricity of axiom
systems should be out of reach of Frege’s “conceptual framework” as it were.
To be more specific let’s consider as a concrete example the (conjunction of the) fol-
lowing four sentences A:
A1: ∀x∃ySxy
A2: ∀x∀y∀z(Sxy ∧ Sxz → y = z)
A3: ¬∃xS<xx
A4: ∀x(Nx↔ S≤0x)
Here 0 stands for the number Zero, Sxy for the two-place relation y is a successor of
x and Nx for the concept x is a natural number.36 Note that we are not considering A1 -
A4 as “schemes” or something alike. In A1 - A4 the concepts Nx, Sxy and 0 are assumed
to have a definite meaning, they are basic concepts as Frege would have conceived of basic
concepts. The first axiom for instance expresses the basic arithmetical truth that every
natural number has a successor and the second that this successor is unique. Were Frege
not a logicist (hence believing that Nx, Sxy and 0 could be defined and A1 - A4 proved),
these sentences could have well served as a basis for arithmetic. That is, they could have
been accepted by him as proper axioms.
As I have stated earlier, it would have made no sense for Frege to ask about “models”
34For more on Frege’s fixed meaning conception see [1].
35See Frege’s [16] and [17]. More on this topic will be said in the second article of this dissertation.
36Note that, on a modern formulation the mentioning of the predicate N is suppressed A4 would thus be
represented by ∀xS≤0x. The restriction of the quantifiers to some domain is effected metatheoretically by letting
the quantifiers range over some domain. More on this topic will be said later. It is well known that the axioms
A1 - A4 are just a variant of the famous (second-order) Peano-axioms for arithmetic, i.e. the Peano-axioms can
be derived from A1 - A4 and vice versa. See [28].
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of this axiom system. On Frege’s account a proper axiom expresses a particular proposi-
tion and as such “leaves no room for different interpretations”.37 But now consider the
following move. Instead of asking if the system of proper axioms A is categorical, we
consider the set of conditions AC(X, Y, z) corresponding to A. That is, in every axiom of
A, the basic concepts are replaced by variables of the appropriate type.
AC1 : ∀x∃yY xy
AC2 : ∀x∀y∀z(Y xy ∧ Y xz → y = z)
AC3 : ¬∃xY <xx
AC4 : ∀x(Xx↔ Y ≤xz)
It seems then that nothing has changed, except that letters are replaced by other
letters. But from the Fregean perspective it is important to notice that N,S and 0 are
supposed to have a particular meaning, whereas X, Y and z are variables, designating
nothing at all. A1 for instance does no longer express the proposition that every natural
number has a successor, but now expresses a condition which a particular relation can
have or not. That is, AC as a whole is no longer an axiom system in the Fregean sense but
a set of higher-order conditions and we can ask if a given sequence of meaningful concepts
has the property defined by these conditions or not. The triple 〈N,S, 0〉 for instance has
the property defined by AC , for if these concepts are substituted for the variables in AC
we just get back to the axioms A. Furthermore we can ask if any two triples consisting of a
concept, a relation and a distinguished object, satisfying these conditions, are isomorphic.
Now, as a matter of fact, Frege was not only not precluded from asking this question,
but he answered it in the course of proving his Theorem 263 of his Basic Laws of Arith-
metic, which essentially states that the number of a “simply infinite system” is ℵ0. He
did so by proving first a general theorem justifying definition by recursion and then shows
that for any triple 〈D,R, a〉 satisfying the condition AC we can define by recursion an
isomorphism between this triple and 〈N,S, 0〉 (which trivially implies that D must have
the cardinality of the natural numbers). It is worth quoting Frege himself:38
37[40] p. 79.
38For a detailed reconstruction of Frege’s proof of theorem 263 see [29].
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Wir beweisen nun die Umkehrung des Satzes (207), dass na¨mlich Endlos [the
number of natural numbers, i.e. ℵ0; author] die Anzahl ist, die einem Begriffe
zukommt, wenn sich die unter diesen Begriff fallenden Gegensta¨nde in eine Reihe
ordnen lassen, die mit einem gewissen Gegenstande anfa¨ngt und endlos fortla¨uft,
ohne in sich zuru¨ckzulaufen und ohne sich zu verzweigen. Es kommt darauf an zu
zeigen, dass Endlos die Anzahl ist, die einem Begriffe Glied einer solchen Reihe
zukommt. [...] Wir benutzen hierzu den Satz (32) und haben eine Beziehung
nachzuweisen, welche die Anzahlenreihe in die mit x [z in our formulation AC ;
author] anfangende q-Reihe [Y -series in our formulation; author] und deren
Umkehrung diese in jene abbildet. Es liegt nahe, die 0 dem x, die 1 dem auf
x na¨chsfolgenden Gliede der q-Reihe und so immer die na¨chstfolgende Anzahl
dem na¨chstfolgenden Gliede der q-Reihe zuzuordnen. Wir fassen immer ein
Glied der Anzahlenreihe und ein Glied der q-Reihe zu einem Paare zusammen
und bilden aus diesen Paaren eine Reihe. Die reihenbildende Beziehung ist
dadurch bestimmt, dass ein Paar zu einem zweiten Paare dann in ihr steht,
wenn das erste Glied des ersten Paares zum ersten Gliede des zweiten Paares
in der nf -Beziehung [the successor-relation; author] und das zweite Glied des
ersten Paares zum zweiten Gliede des zweiten Paares in der q-Beziehung steht.39
Frege’s sketch here is straighforward and can be illustrated like this:
0
nf //

1
nf //

2
nf //

3
nf //

4
nf //

...
x q
//
OO
x1 q
//
OO
x2 q
//
OO
x3 q
//
OO
x4 q
//
OO
...
Bearing in mind that the axioms A1 - A4 are equivalent to more standard formulations
of arithmetic (the Dedekind-Peano axioms), it should be clear that what Frege is talking
about in this passage is just a formalized version of a standard proof of categoricity for
second-order arithmetic.
What are we to do with this? If it is true that model-theoretic reasoning was utterly
foreign to Frege, we should be able to make out some point that disqualifies the reasoning
39[18], pp. 210-211 (S. 179).
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behind Theorem 263 as “genuinely” model-theoretic. To see what this point might be let
us look at a little bit closer at modern model-theory.
1.3 Truth in a Model, Validity and Semantic consequence
The notion of truth in a model is essential for modern logical theory, for it seems clear
that certain metatheoretical questions cannot even be stated without it. A case in point
is the already mentioned question of categoricity of a system of axioms (or “conditions”).
But there are others, like the question of completeness or soundness of some given de-
ductive system, concepts that relate deductive consequence/theoremhood to logical con-
sequence/logical truth, notions which are defined in terms of being true in a model. A
precise formulation of these concepts is not just needed for theoretical reasons, but it is
necessitated in order to spell out what is involved in “applications” of these concepts, for
instance in independence proofs.
Now, it is hard to make out a core-set of features that qualifies some part of logico-
mathematical reasoning as genuinely model-theoretic. The problem of delineating what
kind of arguments should count as “model-theoretic” becomes even fuzzier if historical fig-
ures are assessed. Again, care has to be taken to avoid anachronism here. Historically, the
development of 20th century model-theory can be traced back on different developments
within logical theory and mathematics such as
1. The emergence of Non-Euclidean Geometry in the 19th century (Gauss, Bolyai,
Lobachevski, Klein, etc.)
2. The adoption of algebraic methods for investigations in logic (Schro¨der, Peirce, Boole,
etc.)
3. The isolation of restricted parts of what earlier counted as “logic”; in particular the
emergence of first-order logic40
40Note that 20th century model-theory is deeply connected with first-order logic. One of the reasons for this
seems to be the simple fact that the model-theory of higher-order languages/theories is just not that interesting.
Many interesting mathematical structures can be captured up to isomporphism in higher-order languages, so there
are not much “different” models to investigate. First-order logic on the other hand has the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem-
property and is compact, both properties implying that each first-order theory has a wide range of structurally
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4. The development of set-theory as a discipline in its own right; in particular the
emergence of the notion of an arbitrary set as opposed to sets as extensions of concepts
(Cantor, Zermelo, etc.)
5. The clarification of the concepts of truth in a model and logical consequence in terms
of satisfaction (Tarski)
Here I will not try to tell a convincing story about the origins and conceptual structure
of modern model theory, taking into account all the developments listed above.41 What
I am interested in here is the “spirit” behind model-theoretic reasoning and the question
if Frege was able to grasp this spirit (or at least some of it).
A general feature that is often said to be basic for the “model-theoretic point of view” is
a largely structuralist conception of axiomatic systems. What is meant by a structuralist
conception is that axiom systems are characterized, not by their deductive consequences,
but by the structures that satisfy these axioms. Prerequisite for such an understanding
of axiom systems is that axioms be conceived of as uninterpreted (or re-interpretable)
schemes. So on this account, there is no longer a difference between a system of axioms,
say, for geometry and “axioms” for groups or vector spaces. It is clear that Frege would
have dismissed such a blurring, given his old-fashioned conception of axioms as basic
truths. According to Frege this would amount simply to a confusion between proper ax-
ioms and conditions which can be satisfied or not. But suppose now we would substitute
the word “axiom” by the word “condition” whenever the “modern” model-theorist would
use the word “axiom”, just like we did with A and AC some paragraphs earlier. It seems
then that “model-theoretic” talk about axioms and the structures that satisfy them could
be translated into talk about conditions and the structures that satisfy them. In partic-
ular, there would be no presuppostions of a conceptual nature whose non-appreciation
would prevent Frege from engaging in “model-theoretic” questions.
In order to get a better grip on what is the matter here, let us be a little bit more
different models. Another reason might be a general tendency to focus investigations on first-order logic as
the “core” of logic, due to philosophical worries concerning higher-order logic. To this end see Quine’s classical
Philosophy of Logic ([49]), chapter 5.
41See [11] or [35] for attempts to do so. Compare also [56] for a discussion of model-theory in the 30’s, a
formative period of modern model-theory.
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careful and restrict – for the moment – attention to first-order logic and its modern
modeltheoretic semantics and see how the notion of truth in a model is defined for such
a standard-language. A first-order language L is specified by the following items: 1.
The (so-called) logical constants ∀,∧,¬,= 2. A denumerable set of individual variables
V ar(L) := {x, y, z, ...} and 3. a denumerable set of (so-called) non-logical constants σ
(the “signature”). The set of well-formed formulas is then recursively defined as usual. A
model (or more precisely, a σ-model) M for such a language is then defined as an ordered
pair 〈D, I〉, consisting of some set D (the domain) and a function I (the interpretation-
function), which assigns
1. an element I(a) = a∗ ∈ D to each individual constant a ∈ σ
2. a set I(R) = R∗ ⊆ Dn to each n-ary relation sign R ∈ σ and
3. a function I(f) = f ∗ : Dn −→ D to each n-ary function sign f ∈ σ
In order to define the notion of truth in a model then, one has to define the notion
of satisfaction first. To do so, define (for any given model M) an M-assignment to be a
function s : V ar(L) −→ D, and for any given assignment s, define an x-variant of s to
be an assignment which is just like s, exept (possibly) for the variable x.
The satisfaction relation s (relative to some assignment s) between a σ-model M and
a σ-formula φ is then defined recursively as follows:
1. M s Rt1, ...tn iff. 〈Is(t1), ...Is(tn)〉 ∈ I(R) (for an n-ary relation R and terms
t1, ...tn
42)
2. M s ¬φ iff. M 2s φ
3. M s (φ ∧ ψ) iff. M s φ and M s ψ
4. M s ∀xφ iff. for all x-variants s′: M s′ φ
The notion of a sentence φ (a formula containing no free individual variables) being true
42The class of σ-terms is defined recursively, just like the interpretation Is(t) of a term t (in M) relative
to an assignment s. That is Is(t) = s(t) if t is a variable x; Is(t) = I(a) = a∗ if t is a constant a and
Is(t) = f∗(I(t1), ...I(tn)) if t = f(t1, ...tn) for some function sign f and terms t1, ...tn.
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in a model M, in symbols M  φ, is then defined by “quantifying away” the assignment-
parameter s:
Definition 1. M  φ iff. for all assignments s: M s φ
If Φ is a set of σ-sentences, we define
Definition 2. M  Φ iff. for all φ ∈ Φ: M  φ
Based on this notion of truth in a model, the relation of (first-order) logical conse-
quence between a σ-theory Φ and a σ-sentence φ (in symbols, Φ 1 φ) and the notion of
satisfiability, are defined thusly:
Definition 3. Φ 1 φ iff. for all models M: If M  Φ, then M  φ
Definition 4. T is satisfiable iff. there is a model M, such that M  T
In particular, a σ-sentence φ is said to be valid (i.e. a logical truth), if it follows logically
from the “empty theory”, i.e. if it is true in all models.
The extension of these definitions to higher-order languages is straightforward (as-
suming a standard account of higher-order quantification). A model for a second-order
language for instance, is the same thing as a model for a first-order language, i.e. a
domain together with an interpretation function. The only thing that has to be done
additionally, is to redefine an assignment to be a function that assigns to every first-order
variable some element d ∈ D and every n-ary second-order variable some subset S∗ of
Dn.43
In the recursive definition of satisfaction one adds the following clause for atomic
formulas
M s Xt1...tn iff. 〈I(t1), ...I(tn)〉 ∈ s(X) for each n-ary relation variable X
as well as a clause for second-order quantifiers
M s ∀Xφ iff. for all X-variants s′: M s′ φ
43If one adopts a non-standard account of second-order quantification, then not every S ∈ P(D) might be a
possible value of the assignment function s. The domain of the second-order variables might be restricted to some
subset S of P(D).
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The notions of (second-order) truth in M, logical consequence (in symbols, Φ 2 φ)44,
validity and satisfiability are defined completely analogous to their first-order counter-
parts.
Note first that the notion of first-order validity can be restated in pure second-order
logic. Say φ is some sentence of a first-order language L containing as only non-logical
constant the predicate P . Then φ is first-order valid if and only if the pure second-
order sentence ∀Xφ(X) is second-order valid (where φ(X) is the result of replacing each
occurence of the predicate P with the variable X). Similarly, φ is first-order satisfiable if
and only if ∃Xφ(X) is second-order satisfiable.
Similar remarks apply to the notion of logical consequence for finitely axiomatized
theories Φ as well. In particular: For every finitely axiomatized first- or second-order
theory Φ that includes only “first-order non-logical constants” (like A from above) we
have: Φ  φ iff. Φ→ φ is valid iff. ∀ ~X(Φ( ~X)→ φ( ~X)) is valid.45 So in discussing finitely
axiomatized theories we can, without loss of generality, restrict attention to the concept
of validity of sentences of pure second-order logic. Note in particular that a model for a
pure second-order sentence is just a set D.
Now, if one wants to be careful, and makes explicit the metatheory M, in which these
definitions are given and which is taken to be some standard set-theory (like ZFC), what
one gets is essentially this:
Definition 5. A first-order sentence φ is valid iff. ∀DSat(D, p∀ ~Xφ( ~X)q) is a theorem
of M
and
Definition 6. A first-order sentence φ is satisfiable iff. ∃DSat(D, p∃ ~Xφ( ~X)q) is a the-
orem of M
Here pψq stands for the “M-code” of the pure second-order formula ψ and Sat(x, y)
is simply the “M-coded” version of the relation .
Similar “definitions” of validity and satisfiability can be given mutatis mutandis for
44If no confusion is to be expected, superscripts, indicating the order of the consequence relation, are dropped.
45Here Φ is to be understood as the conjunction of the finitely many sentences in Φ and ∀ ~X as a string of
quantifiers binding the variables in φ( ~X).
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languages of still higher order as well. For an n-th order language one defines validity
by ∀DSat(D, p∀ ~X1... ~Xnφ( ~X1... ~Xn)q), where the pure (n+ 1)st-order formula φ( ~X1... ~Xn)
is the result of replacing all the “non-logical constants” of order ≤ n by variables of the
appropriate type.46
Now, keeping in mind the points just made, what “model-variation” essentially comes
down to can be seen to be metatheoretic domain-variation. That is, the metatheoretic
“model-quantifiers” in the definitions of validity, satisfiability and logical consequence
are essentially just quantifiers ranging over the sets whose existence is implied by the
metatheory M. So in fixing a domain D, the possible values of the “interpretation
function” are thereby fixed as well, for the “interpretations” with respect to a given
domain D are just the possible assignments over that domain.
The possiblity of this kind of metatheoretic “domain-variation” is in fact by many
regarded as some key ingredient of the “model-theoretic viewpoint”.47 So if it could be
shown that domain variation is in no way intelligible to Frege, it would be shown thereby
that anything even close to model-theory in spirit would be foreign to Frege as well.
Although Frege never conceives of metatheoretic “domain variability” in the sense just
explicated, he seems to have been aware of something very close to it in spirit. This
should come as no surprise in the light of Frege’s Theorem 263, where something like
“domain-variation” has to be involved. So it might be instructive to look more closely on
what this surrogate might be.
The basic idea here ist this: instead of using a metatheoretic quantifier, quantifying
in the metatheory over the possible domains of the objectlinguistic quantifiers, something
similar to domain-variation can be achieved by restricting the object-linguistic quantifiers
in the object-language to some domain predicate. For this, one defines recursively the
relativization of a formula φ to some predicate P . The crucial clauses are those for the
quantifiers:
46As an example, consider the second-order sentence ∀X∀Y (Nu(X) = Nu(Y ) ↔ X ≈ Y ). Here Nu is the
non-logical number-operator, and ≈ the (second-order definable) relation of equinumerosity. The satisfiability
of this sentence (Hume’s Principle, as it is called nowadays) can be expressed as the satisfiability of the pure
third-order sentence ∃f∀X∀Y (f(X) = f(Y ) ↔ X ≈ Y ), i.e. Hume’s Principle is satisfiable if and only if
∃DSat(D, p∃f∀X∀Y (f(X) = f(Y )↔ X ≈ Y )q) is a theorem of M.
47See for instance [35]. For further discussion compare [56].25
(∀xφ)P := ∀x(Px→ φP ) and (∃xφ)P := ∃x(Px ∧ φP )48
The “domain-variability” required in the definitions of validity, satisfiability and logi-
cal consequence is then effected by object-linguistic quantification over the predicate P .
Moreover, analogues of the definitions of validity, satisfiability and logical consequence (for
finitely axiomatized theories) given earlier that are compatible with this broadly Fregean
view can then be given thusly:
Definition 7. φ is valid iff. ∀P (∀ ~Xφ( ~X))P is a theorem of logic
Similarly
Definition 8. φ is satisfiable iff. ∃P (∃ ~Xφ( ~X))P is a theorem of logic
and finally
Definition 9. φ is a logical consequence of Φ iff. ∀P (∀ ~X(Φ( ~X)→ φ( ~X)))P is a theorem
of logic
The “domain-variability” needed in Frege’s theorem 263 can then be seen to be effected
as follows: The key here is axiom 4., ∀x(Nx ↔ S≤0x), which states that x is a natural
number if and only if x can be reached from zero in a finite number of successor-steps.
Note that in a modern standard-formulation, axiom 4. would be simply ∀xS≤0x, leaving
the domain implicit, whereas on the Fregean formulation a “domain-predicate” N is used.
This carries over to the condition AC corresponding to A, where the concept of natural
number N is replaced by a variable X. Speaking anachronistically, a “model” for AC is the
same thing as a model for the theory formulated without the use of a domain-predicate.
The difference is that, on a modern view, a domain is provided by “interpreting” the
“quantifiers”, whereas what is “interpreted” here is the variable X. “Domain-variability”
is then achieved simply by object-linguistic quantification over the “variabilized” domain
predicate.
48The relativization to a predicate P for Higher-order quantifiers is defined similarily. The clauses for second-
order quantifiers for instance are: (∀Xφ)P := ∀x(∀x(Xx→ Px)→ φP ) and (∃Xφ)P := ∃x(∀x(Xx→ Px) ∧ φP ).
Relativization to some predicate is of course a standard tool in modern axiomatic set-theory and is treated
informally as being of one kind with the notion of being true in a model. See [42], p. 112.
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It is quite safe to say that this reconstruction of logical consequence (basic concepts are
represented by variables, domain-variability is achieved by relativization) is essentially
the way Frege reconstructs the informal notion of logical consequence and validity as
used for instance by Hilbert in his independence- and consistency proofs concerning his
axiomatization of Euklidean geometry.49 This can be seen most clearly in the second part
of Frege’s 1906-paper On the foundations of geometry. There we can read for instance
this:
If, as we have assumed, the words “point”, “straight line”, etc. do not designate
but merely are to lend generality, like the letters in arithmetic, then it will be
conducive to our insight into the true state of affairs to actually use letters for
this purpose. Let us therefore stipulate the following: Instead of “the point A
lies in the plane α”, let us say “A stands in the p-relation to α”. Instead of “the
point A lies on the straight line a”, let us say “A stands in the q-relation to a”.
Instead of “A is a point” let us say “A is a Π”.
Hilbert’s axiom I.1 can now be expressed like this:
If A is a Π and B is a Π, then there is something to which both A and B stand
in the q-relation.50
What Frege suggests here is of course the strategy explained so far, i.e. to view “basic
concepts” as variables (“letters”). This is in particular so for the “domain-predicate”, i.e.
the “points”. Frege goes on to review Hilbert’s methodology thusly reconstructed and
explores what it means to speak of theorems of a thusly understood “axiom system” and
comes essentially to Definition 7.51
It is to be noted that variants of this reconstruction of logical consequence were ex-
tremely common at least until the 30s of the 20th century.52 Even Hilbert himself seems
49In retrospect, Bernays confirmed this in his [2].
50[40] pp. 83-84.
51For further discussion of Frege’s reconstruction see [52] or [39].
52See [56] for an exposition of the situation concerning logical consequence and validity in the 20s and 30s.
Particularly interesting in this context is Carnap’s [9], which is something like a border-stone between traditional
axiomatics on the one hand and formal axiomatics on the other hand. For a discussion of Carnap see [57] and
[58].
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to have adopted a view quite similar to Frege’s. This can be seen for instance in Hilbert’s
and Bernays’ Grundlagen der Mathematik from 1934. After having axiomatized a part of
plane geometry by means of (contentually understood) 3-place relations Zw (“between-
ness”) and Gr (“lie on”), the axiom system is represented by A(Gr,Zw). We can then
read this:
[...] if in axiomatic geometry the respective names for relations in intuitive
geometry like “lie on” or “between” are used this is only a concession to custom
and a means of simplyfying the connection of the theory with intuitive facts. In
fact, however, in formal axiomatics the fundamental relations play the role of
variable predicates. [...]
The axiom system consists of a demand on two such predicates expressed in the
logical formula A(R, S), that we get from A(Gr,Zw) when we replace Gr(x, y, z)
with R(x, y, z), Zw(x, y, z) with S(x, y, z).53
Further,
From this point of view a sentence of the form S(Gr,Zw) corresponds to the
logical statement [emphasis by the author] that for any predicates R(x, y, z),
S(x, y, z) satisfying the demand A(R, S), the relation S(R, S) also holds; in
other words, for any two predicates R(x, y, z), S(x, y, z) the formula
A(R, S)→ S(R, S)
represents a true statement. In this way a geometrical sentence is transformed
into a sentence of pure predicate logic.54
Just like Frege had suggested nearly 30 years earlier, Hilbert here speaks of “variables”
instead of “basic concepts”. So Hilbert seems to have come in agreement with Frege over
his own methodology (at least to a certain extent) after all.55
53[34], p. 7
54[34], p. 7
55I say “to a certain extent” because there are still differences: One point of divergence relates to the problem of
domain-variability. Hilbert (at least in [34]) conciously formulates geometry without the invocation of an explicit
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Now, there are still clear differences to make out between the modern definitions and
the tentative suggestions made by Frege (and between the definitions given by any other
pre-50s logician for that matter). For one thing, the modern definitions are framed for
a particular object theory O, (formulated in some object-language LO) in a particular
metatheory M (formulated in some meta-language LM), and which is usually taken to be
some standard set theory like ZFC, if made explicit. On the modern account object-and
metatheory are kept strictly seperated. By contrast, the Frege-style definitions are framed
within a single higher-order framework. This leaves us with some important issues.
1.4 Object- and Metalanguage
It is well known that the distinction between object- and metalanguage has been intro-
duced in a rigorous way by Tarski in his The concept of Truth in formalized languages.56
Now, it might have become entirely natural for modern logicians to precisely delineate
what is to be counted as object-language and what is to be counted as meta-language
when it comes to metatheoretic issues. But the reason why Tarski put so much emphasis
on the distinction in the first place was rather specific. As Tarski has shown, an adequate
definition of truth for an arbritrary (interpreted) object-language could always be given in
a (sufficiently rich) meta-language, but not in the object-language itself. This is of course
just Tarski’s famous undefinability theorem. Moreover, it can be seen that it is not only
not possible to define truth for a given object-language in that very same language, but
it is not even possible for a language to contain its own truth predicate, i.e. as an unde-
fined primitive. Given these limitative results concerning the possibility of developing the
semantics of an interpreted language within this very language, it is understandable that
Tarski was dwelling on the distinction between object- and metalanguage (or object- and
metatheory as we would say nowadays).
Now, usually, modern logicians are not that interested in defining truth (simpliciter)
“domain-predicate” for points. Instead, Hilbert speaks of a “hidden variable”. “It is to be observed that along
with the determination of the predicates the domain of individuals over which the variables x, y, ... range has to
be fixed. This enters into a logical formula as a kind of hidden variable.” ([34], p.13). Although this is still not
the modern account, it is clearly closer to it in spirit. For further discussion compare [56].
56[63], pp. 152-278.
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for interpreteted languages, but they are interested in defining truth in a model M, for
variable M. For the most part, they are not interested in truth in the “intended model”.
In fact, the notion of “intendend model” seems to be eschewed altogether. The interest
in the notion of being true in a model is not due to an interest in “scientific semantics”,
but due to the interest in metatheoretic notions like validity, satisfiability and logical
consequence. As we have seen, it is not that clear that for this purpose the distinction
between object- and metalanguage is that important, for a lot of what seems to be intended
with speaking about various models can be simulated to a certain extent in Higher-Order
logic.
To be sure, there are limits of – or problems at least – with this reconstruction of
metatheoretical concepts within higher-order logic. As we saw, one of the main reasons
for this reconstruction of metatheoretical concepts was to make more precise the notions
of validity and logical consequence as they were used informally in independence- or
consistency proofs. But in order to serve this purpose the “logic” employed therein has to
be rather strong. To give a simple, yet still instructive example, consider the first-order
schemes
α := ∃xRxx
σ := ∀x∃yRxy
τ := ∀x∀y∀z(Rxy ∧Ryz → Rxz)
We then ask if τ∧σ  α or if τ∧σ 2 α, which, on the suggested reconstruction, become
the question if the higher-order sentence
(∗): ∀X(∀R(τ(R) ∧ σ(R)→ α(R)))X
is a theorem of logic or not. Now informally, (∗) is clearly not valid, for there are
(necessarily infinite) domains in which τ , σ and ¬α are satisfied. Hence τ ∧σ∧¬α should
be satisfiable, that is
(∗∗): ∃X(∃R(τ(R) ∧ σ(R) ∧ ¬α(R)))X
should be a theorem of logic.
From a modern point of view, two questions arise immediatly: What are the quantifiers
in this formula supposed to range over (in particular the initial “domain-quantifier”)? And
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what is meant by the locution “theorem of logic”? The Fregean answer to the first ques-
tion seems to be more or less straightforward (at least for the pre-May-1902-Frege): the
intial quantifier ranges over (absolutely) every possible referent of a predicate-expression
(Or, to put it in un-Fregean terms, over (absolutely) every set.) And a “theorem of logic”
is understood as a sentence provable from the general laws of logic, i.e. higher-order logic
including a theory of extensions. That higher-logic, including a theory of extensions, is
Frege’s “background-theory” for investigations of independence of conditions, fits nicely
with a passage of his Grundgesetze, where he comments on his definition of a “Positivalk-
lasse”:
With the installation of this definition, I have taken the trouble to fix only
the necessary conditions, and only those that are independent from each other.
That this has succeeded can not admittedly be proven, but it becomes likely
however, if attempts to derive one of these conditions from others fail many
times.57
Apparently thinking that this could be misinterpreted, he includes the following re-
mark:
It should not necessarily have been stated that the independence of the stated
conditions from one another could not be proven. It is of course conceivable
that one could find classes of relations, to which every condition would apply
but one, and that every condition would fail in one of the examples. But it
should be questioned whether at this stage of the investigation it is possible to
give such examples without presupposing geometry, or fractional, negative and
irrational numbers, or facts of experience.58
As Tappenden remarks, the only things that Frege in this passage explicitly excludes
for a proof of independence of the stated conditions, are things that he back then didn’t
regard to have established rigorously as belonging to “logic”.59 So the “counter-models”
57[18] pp. 467-468 (§ 175, S. 172)
58[18], p. 534. (Anmerkung zu Ende § 175, S. 172)
59See [60], p. 216
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that would instantiate an independence claim are required to be drawn from logic alone
(or what Frege thinks as belonging to “logic” at this stage).
After receiving Russells letter, things become more fuzzy. Although this is not entirely
clear, Frege seems to have abandoned the view that there are logical objects (like exten-
sions), i.e. objects whose existence is implied by the basic laws of logic.60 This implies
that the ressources to provide “models” (for instance to instantiate the existence claim
(∗∗) from above) by logical reasoning alone might be no longer available.
To state the obvious: the role of providing the needed models is, on the modern
account, played by some sufficiently strong set theory M as metatheory.61 Although this
is clearly an important difference between modern model-theoretic metatheory and earlier
accounts, it does not seem to be that important from a conceptual point of view. It is more
a question of what can be done by adopting a particular background-theory, that is: does
it, for instance, provide enough models to instantiate independence claims for arbitrary
axiom systems (or conditions). As I have already mentioned, it was a widely held view
until the early 40s that the realm of “logic” is far wider than what today is regarded as
belonging to Higher-order logic, let alone First-order logic (remember Hempel!). So it
seems that at least a large part of “model-theoretic metatheory” (or ancient counterparts
thereof) could be developed within the “logic” of, say, Principia Mathematica.
However, what is an important difference is that, whereas on the modern account set
theory itself is capable of being “reinterpreted” (just like any other axiomatized theory),
the “background-theory” of Frege, i.e. logic, is not. Frege’s logic was meant to be, as was
stated at the beginning of this introduction, a meaningful formalism, a fully interpreted
“universal language”. An important lesson to be drawn from this is that metatheory is,
from a modern point of view, essentially relative. There is no vantage point from which
metatheoretical investigations could be judged absolutely. Modeltheoretic consistency- or
independence proofs for instance are always relative to the set-theoretical metatheory in
which they are framed.
60In Carnap’s lecture notes for instance, extensions are not mentioned as beloning to the realm of “logic”. See
[10].
61The independence claim regarding σ, α and τ for instance is guaranteed by an axiom stating the existence of
some infinite set. If only finite models were available in our metatheory, α were indeed a consequence of τ and σ.
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Frege, on the other hand, did believe in such an “absolute” vantage point (or so it
seems), and it is precisely fixed by the universal laws of logic.
1.5 Introductory remarks to the papers collected in this Dissertation
So let me summarize what kind of metatheoretical questions I think Frege “could have
asked”.
As it should be obvious from what has been said in the previous sections, I think that
a lot of what today counts as “metatheory” could have been done by Frege, given some
terminological adjustments. Metatheoretical questions that seem to lie within the bounds
of Frege’s “conceptual scheme” include
1. Completeness and soundness of deductive systems of restricted parts of what Frege
would have regarded as belonging to the realm of logic.
2. Questions of “applied metatheory”: In particular investigations relating to “formal
axiomatics”, such as questions of independence, consistency and categoricity of ax-
ioms (or “conditions”).62
Of course, as I have said earlier, in claiming that Frege “could have been engaged”
in such questions, it is not thereby said that he would have attributed to them the
significance a modern logician might attribute to them. But this does not seem to be
the issue when Frege is said to be “universalist” and therefore unable to be concerned
with such questions in principle. The completeness of a given formalization of deductive
consequence of first-order logic for instance, is only interesting to the extent that it shows
that different concepts of consequence are “in harmony”. But the fundamental importance
that is sometimes attributed to completeness seems to stem from the assumption that the
notion of semantic consequence is somewhat more basic. And further, that the notion
62It must be noted that this is true only to a certain extent : many interesting metatheoretical questions are
concerned with axiomatic systems that are not finitely axiomatized. Standard first-order set theory (ZFC) and
first-order arithmetic are cases in point. It is at least not entirely clear at this point how Frege would have handled
axiom schemes like the first-order induction-scheme. It seems that, from a Fregean point of view, generality should
always be expressible by means of object-linguistic quantifiers. But axiom-schemes require quantification in the
(or a) metatheory over syntactical items (formulas or sentences) of the object theory.
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of semantic consequence is adequately captured by the set-theoretically defined concept
of model-theoretic consequence. But all of this can (and has) been doubted, as I have
mentioned earlier. Frege, to state the most obvious, would not be very happy to base
the notion of logical consequence on a theory of sets. It is well known that, even before
Russell’s letter came, Frege was very suspicous of sets. From his point of view, sets had to
be construed as extensions of concepts if they were to be intelligible at all. It is not entirely
clear what Frege’s position with regard to sets was after learning of Russell’s paradox, but
he seems to have upheld the view that sets had to be construed as extensions of concepts,
even though talk about extensions had to be restricted in some way. Anyways, the view
that one could define a notion of logical consequence in terms of sets (or extensions) and
believe it to be more fundamental than, say, derivability by forms of inference that are
accepted as logical, would, I think, not come to his mind.
But there are still open problems when it comes to the questions of independence
and consistency of proper axioms, as Frege conceives of them. As it has been shown,
the independence of “axioms” understood as conditions would have posed no problems
for Frege. Note though that, on Frege’s account, it is not obvious that in showing the
independence of the conditions corresponding to some set of proper axioms we have
thereby shown the independence of the proper axioms themselves. The problem of what
is meant by a “genuine axiom” and “independence” as applied to genuine axioms, is not
even posed yet. So the questions still remain:
• What, according to Frege, is to be understood by a “genuine axiom”?
• What is meant by “independence” if applied to genuine axioms and how, according
to Frege, can it be shown (if it can be shown at all) that a given set of genuine axioms
is independent?
• What is meant by “consistency” if applied to genuine axioms and how, according to
Frege, can it be shown (if it can be shown at all) that a given set of genuine axioms
is consistent?
The articles collected in this dissertation are concerned exactly with these questions.
The focus on Hilbert as providing the area of friction (as well as providing points of
contact in his later writings) in this introduction turns out to be no coincidence. For it is
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precisely in his engagement in critising Hilbert’s methodology in his Grundlagen der Ge-
ometrie 1899 (which is part of what has later been called the “Frege-Hilbert-Controversy”)
where Frege develops his ideas on this issue. In a series of articles, dating from 1903 to
1906, titled U¨ber die Grundlagen der Geometrie63, Frege first tries to elucidate the prob-
lems that, according to him, Hilbert’s methodology bear. Frege felt himself forced to write
these articles because Hilbert refused to publish their correspondance, which had lasted
for a couple of months, starting with a letter from Frege from December 1899 and ending
with a short letter from Hilbert, dating from September 1900. After having set out what
he thinks is the core of Hilbert’s method, Frege goes on to review why he considers this
method to be flawed if applied to genuine axioms. In the last section of his 1906 article,
Frege then elucidates how, according to him, independence proofs regarding genuine ax-
ioms should be handled. Essentially, Frege’s suggestion is that a “new science” has to be
established in order to investigate the question of independence of genuine axioms. The
articles contained in this dissertation take exactly this at their starting point.
The first article is concerned with a particular interpretive issue concerning Frege’s new
science, viz. the fact that according to Frege genuine axioms are thoughts, i.e. intensional
entities. It is argued that this might create substantial problems for Frege, some of
which Frege might have been well aware of. Remember that Frege’s formal systems in
his Begriffsschrift as well as in the Grundgesetze are firmly extensional, so an adequate
treatment of independence of genuine axioms creates the need to provide an account of
such entities. Further it is argued that Frege must have been aware of this problem, and
that this was one of the reasons why he was somewhat reluctant towards his own proposal
concerning independence proofs, set out in the last part of the 1906-article.
The second article is the core of this dissertation and presents a more detailled re-
construction of what Frege’s “new science” might have looked like, had he spent more
effort in spelling it out. It is shown that his proposal bears – in its essence – important
points of contact with 20th century logical theory. In particular, Frege’s “axiomatic”
approach to metatheoretic questions (like independence of axioms) seems to suggest itself
as a forerunner of the axiomatic treatment of metatheoretical concepts as exemplified by
63Collected and translated in English in [40].
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axiomatic theories of truth. In fact, Frege’s proposal even presupposes an axiomatization
of truth if fully regimented proofs of independence should be possible.
The last article is an outgrowth of this engagement with Frege’s axiomatic approach
to metatheory. It is concerned with a certain technical point with regards to axiomatic
theories of truth and is meant to provide a contribution to the contemporary discussion.64
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2 Remarks on independence proofs and indirect reference
Abstract.65 In the last two decades there has been increasing interest in a
re-evaluation of Frege’s stance towards consistency- and independence proofs.
Papers by several authors deal with Frege’s views on these topics. In this note
I want to discuss one particular problem, which seems to be a main reason
for Frege’s reluctant attitude towards his own proposed method of proving the
independence of axioms, namely his view that thoughts, i.e. intensional entities
are the objects of metatheoretical investigations. This stands in contrast to more
straightforward interpretations, which claim that Frege’s hesitancy is mainly due
to worries concerning the logical constants or what counts as a logical inference.
2.1 Introduction
In the last two decades there has been increasing interest in a re-evaluation of Frege’s
stance towards consistency- and independence proofs. Papers by Tappenden ([31] and
[32]), Blanchette ([2] and [3]), Hodges ([17]), Antonelli and May ([1]) and others deal
with the question whether Frege was able to generate independence results or whether –
for whatever reason – he was not. The reasons for believing the latter range from general
issues concerning Freges conception of logic (centered around the distinction between
logic as language vs. logic as calculus of the classical [13]) to more specific ones, such as
Blanchette’s analysis-problem.
The most obvious reason for assuming that Frege was able to generate independence
results is that Frege actually provided – with some reservations – a method for proving
the mutual independence of axioms in his 1906-article On the foundations of geometry.
The rest of this paper will be organized as follows: First of all I will give a brief sketch of
the Frege-Hilbert controversy and Frege’s new science (‘new science’ is what Frege calls
the theory in which he wants to prove the independence of real axioms — as opposed
to Hilbertarian ‘Pseudo-axioms’). Next I will argue that the question of independence
proofs within the new science and Frege’s theory of indirect reference, as outlined in his
65This paper has been accepted for publication in History and Philosophy of Logic. Date of acceptance: 7th
June, 2012.
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1891, belong together. This will also partially explain Frege’s reservations concerning his
proposal.
2.2 The Frege-Hilbert Controversy
As is well known, Frege criticized Hilbert’s methodology for proving the consistency and
mutual independence of the axioms of geometry for various reasons, which are closely tied
to his general conception of what axioms and definitions really are, or should be taken to
be.66 As the main points are fairly well known I will just give a brief sketch of Frege’s
main criticisms of Hilbert and how he eventually arrives at his own proposal for proving
independence.67
The first criticism is aimed at Hilbert’s doctrine that axioms can be used to define
‘implicitly’ the basic concepts that occur in these axioms. As Frege understands the
axiomatic method, axioms cannot define anything because axioms and definitions serve
quite different purposes. If we want to axiomatize some piece of knowledge, we lay down a
set of sentences which are known to be true and which cannot be proven from more basic
truths. Definitions on the other hand do not have the purpose of expressing unprovable
truths but are meant to give a meaning to a heretofore meaningless sign. Definitions
therefore cannot be axioms (although they function in inferences as if they were). On the
other hand axioms obviously cannot be definitions in Frege’s strict sense of ‘definition’,
which includes eliminability and conservativeness.
The second criticism is closely related to the first one: As already mentioned, for Frege
axioms are truths which cannot be proven. Therefore, if we lay down some set of sentences
expressing such basic truths we are considering real sentences which are either true or false
and which express – what Frege calls – ‘thoughts’. In proving his independence results
Hilbert on the other hand is not concerned with just one interpretation of his axioms,
but with various ones. That is, Hilbert is considering his system of axioms as laid down
66The 1906 article is in fact adressed against Alvin Korselt, a defender of the Hilbertarian methodology. How-
ever, it is obvious from the short correspondence between Frege and Hilbert, that the main points of Frege’s
criticisms are directed at Hilbert too.
67For an introduction to the Frege-Hilbert controversy see Blanchette’s entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/frege-hilbert/. For a general discussion of the significance of the
Frege-Hilbert dispute see for instance [4], [25], [18] and [33].
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in his Grundlagen der Geometrie (1899 ) as being formal in the sense of being open to
re-interpretation. As he famously writes to Frege:
But surely it is self-evident that every theory is merely a framework or schema
of concepts together with their necessary relations to one another, and that the
basic elements can be construed as one pleases.68
For Frege this is plainly impossible. A proper sentence either has a determinate sense
(that is, expresses a particular thought) or it does not. For the purpose of science it is also
necessary that a sentence has a ‘meaning’ (in Frege’s technical usage of the word) which
means that it is definitely either true or false.69 In short: To speak of ‘uninterpreted
sentences’ is for Frege simply a contradiction in terms. Frege correctly points to the fact
that Hilbert is using the word ‘axiom’ not in its traditional, but a novel sense, and one
which – in Frege’s opinion – lacks the clarity which he expects such a basic concept to
have. As he puts it at the end of the 1906-article with an eye to independence proofs:
As long as the word “axiom” was used as a heading only, a fluctuation in its
reference could be tolerated. Now, however, since the question of whether an
axiom is independent of others has been raised, the word “axiom” has been
introduced into the text itself and something is asserted or proved about what
it is supposed to designate.70
Now the only sense that Frege can make of Hilbert’s method of reinterpretation and his
insistence that the basic concepts ‘point’, ‘line’, etc. of geometry do not mean anything
specific is that they function as variables. For Frege a sign either has a particular meaning
which cannot be altered randomly or it is a letter which serves to lend generality to a
68[20], p. 13
69Recall that Frege introduced the notion of a thought in his landmark paper ‘U¨ber Sinn und Bedeutung’, where
he sets out his semantical theory in order to solve a puzzle with regard to the relation of identity. According to
this theory two dimensions of semantic value can be made out, the level of reference (‘Bedeutung’) and the level
of sense (‘Sinn’). That is, each expression of a language properly so called, has a determinate sense as well as a
reference. The relation between sense and reference is that each expression has a sense which determines or ‘picks
out’ a unique referent in a particular way. Now, according to Frege, a thought is just the sense of a declarative
sentence, and it’s referent is one of the two truth values.
70[20], p. 111
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judgement. So although the ‘pseudo-propositions’ ‘x < 1’ and ‘x > 2’ do not express
thoughts and are neither true nor false, the sentence ‘(∀x)( if x < 1 then x > 2)’ does
express a particular thought and has a determinate truth value (at least if we take the
signs ‘<’, ‘>’, ‘1’ and ‘2’ as having their usual meaning).71
So what Hilbert is in fact proving in the eyes of Frege with his method of reinter-
pretation is not that the real axioms of Euclidean geometry – which have a determinate
meaning – are mutually independent, but that certain second-level concepts are mutually
independent. To be more explicit: Let Geo− stand for the conjunction of the axioms of
Euclidean geometry save the axiom of parallels PA. Then, according to Frege, in replac-
ing each primitive predicate (such as ‘point’, ‘line’, etc.) with a variable of the appropriate
type, we arrive at a formula Geo−(P,L, ...) determining a the second-level concept which
applies to (sequences of) first-level concepts and relations. Similarly, starting from PA we
arrive at a second-level concept PA(P,L, ...). Now, from Frege’s viewpoint, what Hilbert
has shown is that the second-level concept defined by PA(P,L, ...) is independent of the
second-level concept defined by Geo−(P,L, ...) in the sense that the quantified conditional
∀P∀L...(Geo−(P,L, ...) → PA(P,L, ...)) is not logically valid by exhibiting a counterex-
ample, i.e. a sequence of meaningful first-level concepts and relations, which, if substituted
accordingly for the variables, yields a true antecedent and a false consequent.72 But, as
we shall see shortly, this has no obvious bearing on the question of the independence of
the genuine axioms of Euclidean geometry as Frege conceives of them.
In the third section of his 1906 paper on geometry Frege turns to his own account of
how independence proofs should be handled.
The first thing to mention is that Frege states very clearly what he thinks are and what
are not the objects of investigation when we ask ourselves if some axiom is independent
of others. Frege says that we are concerned with thoughts and not the sentences which
express these thoughts. As he writes:
When one uses the phrase ‘prove a proposition’ in mathematics, then by the
word ‘proposition’ we clearly mean not a sequence of words or a group of signs,
but a thought: something of which one can say that it is true. And similarly,
71[20], p. 99
72[20], pp. 83-91. For a classical exposition of this reconstruction of Hilbert see [25] and [18].45
when one is talking about the independence of propositions or axioms, this, too,
will be understood as being about about the independence of thoughts. [...] We
have to distinguish between the external, audible or visible which is supposed
to express a thought, and the thought itself. [...] no one wants to predicate this
independence of what is audible or visible.73
That is, for Frege sentences are just ‘chalk on the board’ or ‘ink on the paper’, they
only have physical properties.74 So when Frege speaks of ‘axioms’ he is not talking about
sentences but about the thoughts they express and the relation of logical dependence is
therefore – strictly speaking – a relation between thoughts. Note that on this account the
sentence ‘The axiom of parallels is independent from the rest of the Euclidean axioms’ is
not just expressing a determinate thought, but also has thoughts as its subject matter. So
unlike other mathematical theories, which have points, numbers or sets as their objects,
the new science deals with thoughts.
Secondly, Frege elucidates what he holds that ‘independence’ – as applied to real
axioms – should be taken to be by referring to what he calls a ‘logical step’. By a ‘logical
step’ he means the following: let Ω be a set of thoughts. If a thought A can be obtained
from Ω by a logical inference, then we can form a new set of thoughts Ω′ by adding the
thought A to the set Ω. Now a thought G is said to be dependent on Ω, if by a finite
sequence of such logical steps we eventually arrive at a set of thoughts Ω′′, of which G
is a member. If this cannot be done, then G is said to be independent of Ω.75 (In what
follows I will understand ‘the thought A is inferable from the thought B’ to mean ‘the
thought A can be obtained by a finite chain of logical inferences from the thought B’).
This explains, why for Frege it is not enough to establish the negation of the conditional
∀P∀L...(Geo−(P,L, ...)→ PA(P,L, ...)) – for in this quantified conditional inferences or
something like inferential relations between thoughts are not even mentioned.
Thirdly, the new science stands on a par with other axiomatic theories like geometry
73[20], p. 101
74As far as the 1903 - 1906 papers are concerned, Frege never distinguishes clearly between expression-types
and expression-tokens. Throughout the 1906-paper the word ‘proposition’ (‘Satz’) is used in the meaning of
sentence-token. Frege, however, was aware of the distinction, as a letter to Dingler shows. See [10], p. 35. In any
case, according to Frege, the relation of independence applies neither to sentence-types nor to sentence-tokens.
75[20], p. 104 46
in that it has its own axioms and basic concepts. Frege writes:
Now we may assume that this new realm has its own specific, basic truths which
are as essential to the proofs constructed in it as the axioms of geometry are to
the proofs of geometry; and that we also need these basic truths especially to
prove the independence of a thought from a group of thoughts.76
It may also be assumed that like any other theory, the new science too should be
formalizable within Frege’s ‘Begriffsschrift’ (or some extension of it). In fact, this was the
very reason for introducing a ‘Begriffsschrift’: it should provide a framework, in which
every piece of knowledge could be expressed and it should provide precise syntactical
rules which guarantee that in a proof no step can occur, which is not in accordance
with accepted forms of inference. So unlike Hilbert, Frege does not rest content with
establishing the independence of axioms informally. Quoting again from Frege’s 1906-
paper:
As it stands, we remain completely in the dark as to what he [Hilbert] really
believes he has proved and which logical and extralogical laws and expedients
he needs for this.77
As in every part of logico-mathematical discourse, the axioms and rules of inference
needed in proofs ultimately have to be laid down explicitly.
These are the main points which have to be kept in mind when talking about Frege’s
new science.
2.3 The new science and indirect reference
As I pointed out in the previous section, according to Frege, the new science has thoughts
as its objects in just the same way as number theory has numbers and geometry points
and lines as its objects. As Frege puts it:
How can one prove the independence of a thought from a group of thoughts?
First of all, it may be noted that with this question we enter into a realm
76[20], p. 106
77[20], pp. 111-112
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that is otherwise foreign to mathematics. For although like all other disciplines
mathematics, too, is carried out in thoughts, still, thoughts are otherwise not
the object of its investigations.78
I also indicated that like any other science the new science must have its basic truths
and that these truths must be expressible in Frege’s system of logic (or some extension).
Frege mentions three such axioms. He states the first two explicitly and elucidates the last
one (which he calls an ‘eﬄux of the formal nature of the logical laws’79) just informally.
The first two are the following:
(NS1) If the thought G follows from the thoughts A,B,C by a logical inference
then G is true.
(NS2) If the thought G follows from the thoughts A,B,C by a logical inference
then each of the thoughts A,B,C is true.
(NS2) codifies Frege’s conviction that something can be inferred only from premises
that are true, whereas (NS1) states that everything so inferred must likewise be true.80
First of all note that Frege is talking about logical inferences. Clearly, Frege has no
general account about what counts as a (‘genuine’) logical inference, but it seems fairly
obvious, that the concept of logical inference is closely tied to the syntactically defined
concept of derivation. At least the kind of deduction-rules and laws Frege actually states
in his Begriffsschrift or his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (save the infamous basic law
V) should count as codifications of genuine logical inferences and logical laws. It has
to be kept in mind however, that inferability is a relation between thoughts, whereas
78[20], p. 106
79[20], p. 107. In fact, this last axiom is the key-axiom of his new science. Roughly speaking, it states that a
logical proof is invariant under substitutions of the non-logical vocabulary. By means of this new axiom it should
be possible to prove the independence of the axiom of parallels from the rest of the Euclidean axioms by finding
a series of concepts and relations which yield true sentences Geo−
′
when substituted for the geometrical concepts
in the actual axioms of Euclidean geometry Geo− (safe the axiom of parallels) and a false sentence PA
′
when
substituted for the geometrical concepts in the axiom of parallels PA. If the axiom of parallels PA were provable
from the rest of the Euclidean axioms Geo−, then, by the new law, PA
′
would be provable from Geo−
′
, and hence
true by (NS1) and (NS2) (soundness) (and the fact that every sentence in Geo−
′
is true). But this contradicts
the falsity of PA
′
.
80So (NS1) and (NS2) imply the ‘soundness’ of the relation of ‘being logically inferable from’. [20], p. 107
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derivability is a relation between sentences. So the fact that Frege admits that he has no
general criterion about what counts as a genuine logical inference shows that Frege was
aware of the possibility that there might be logical inferences that are not represented by
any deduction rules he states for his formal systems and that there might be logical truths,
which are not derivable within these systems.81 After all, the purpose of inventing the
Begriffsschrift was a rather specific one: to deduce arithmetic from logical principles alone
— there was no need for Frege to come up with an exhaustive list of logical principles.
In any case, the relation of ‘being logically inferable from’ appears in the axioms (NS1)
and (NS2) and hence has to be introduced either as a primitive relation or as defined by
other more basic concepts of the new science. So let ‘Bew(ξ, ζ)’ stand for the expression
‘ζ is inferable from ξ’, where the Greek letters ‘ξ’ and ‘ζ’ mark the argument places of this
two-place relational concept. ‘Bew(ξ, ζ)’ expresses a relation which applies to thoughts.
But we have yet to explain how the application of a predicate to a thought is to be
understood. This is where Frege’s theory of indirect reference might be invoked. Recall
that Frege developed his theory of indirect reference in order to deal with opaque contexts,
created for instance by verbs expressing – what are now called – propositional attitudes
(to believe, to know, to hope, etc.). Opaque contexts have the peculiar property that they
seem to create problems for the principle of extensionality, which states that in replacing
a subexpression in a more complex expression with a co-referential expression, the referent
of the complex expression remains the same. If, for instance, in the true sentence ‘Mary
believes that Vienna is the capital of Austria’ the subexpression ‘Vienna is the capital
of Austria’ is replaced with the co-referential expression ‘Kuala Lumpur is the capitol
of Malaysia’, we might yield the falsehood ‘Mary believes that Kuala Lumpur is the
capitol of Malaysia’. Frege’s solution to such apparent counterexamples to the principle
of extensionality is that he determines that in opaque contexts an expression does not have
it’s usual reference (it’s ‘gewo¨hnliche Bedeutung’) but it’s indirect reference (it’s ‘ungerade
81‘In particular, we will find that this final basic law [the law of the ‘eﬄux of the formal nature’] which I have
attempted to elucidate by means of the above mentioned vocabulary still needs more precise formulation, and
that to give this will not be easy. Furthermore, it will have to be determined what counts as a logical inference
and what is proper to logic.’ [20], p 110f. It seems to me though that once it is determined ‘what counts as a
logical inference’, it should be possible to capture these inferences by means of syntactical rules.
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Bedeutung’), which, according to Frege, is just it’s direct sense (it’s ‘gewo¨hnlicher Sinn’).
Therefore, the given example is not a counterexample to the principle of extensionality
after all, because with respect to the given context, the two sentences ‘Vienna is the capitol
of Austria’ and ‘Kuala Lumpur is the capitol of Malaysia’ are not co-referential, for they
do not have the same direct sense (they do not express the same thought).82
Now going back to our question how the inferability-predicate is to be applied to
thoughts: if the context ‘Bew(ξ, ζ)’ is opaque, this will have the effect that sentences
occurring within this context will not have their direct but their indirect reference. And
this in turn will have the consequence that the relation expressed by ‘Bew(ξ, ζ)’ will
apply to the thoughts expressed by these sentences just as intended. But that the context
‘Bew(ξ, ζ)’ should indeed be considered as an opaque context from the Fregean point
of view can plausibly be seen from the following ‘counterexample’ to the principle of
extensionality:
1. It is inferable from (1 + 1 = 2 and 2 + 1 = 3), that (1 + 1) + 1 = 383
2. Vienna is the capital of Austria = (1 + 1) + 1 = 3
3. It is not inferable from (1 + 1 = 2 and 2 + 1 = 3), that Vienna is the capital
of Austria
Obviously there is no significant logical connection between the truth of ‘Vienna is the
capital of Austria’ and the truth of ‘(1 + 1) + 1 = 3’. So what has been said above about
Mary applies here too: If we are interested in the truth of ‘It is inferable from (1 + 1 = 2
and 2 + 1 = 3), that (1 + 1) + 1 = 3’, then, according to Frege, we are not concerned
with the truth of ‘1 + 1 = 2 and 2 + 1 = 3’ or ‘(1 + 1) + 1 = 3’ at all, but rather with the
82For an exposition of Frege’s theory of indirect reference, see his [9]. For a thorough discussion see chapter 9
of Dummett’s [4].
83This must not be confused with the sentence ‘ “(1 + 1) + 1 = 3” is inferable from “1 + 1 = 2 and 1 + 2 = 3” ’
where the relation of inferability is construed as a relation between syntactical objects, namely sentences (sentence-
types). As I mentioned above, for Frege the relation of inferability is a relation which applies to thoughts. But
in ‘ “(1 + 1) + 1 = 3” is inferable from “1 + 1 = 2” and “2 + 1 = 3” ’ the relation of inferability applies to the
sentences ‘(1 + 1) + 1 = 3’ and ‘1 + 1 = 2 and 2 + 1 = 3’ of which “ ‘(1 + 1) + 1 = 3’ ” and “ ‘1 + 1 = 2 and
2 + 1 = 3’ ” are names.
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question what is inferable. We are interested in the thoughts expressed by ‘1 + 1 = 2 and
2 + 1 = 3’ and ‘(1 + 1) + 1 = 3’.84
We can see more clearly now why the Fregean treatment of independence proofs re-
quires serious changes to be made in the Begriffsschrift, as presented in his 1879 or his
1893 : Like any other axiomatic theory the new science too must have as basic truths some
general statements. One might be tempted to regard e.g. (NS1) as an axiom scheme in
the following way:
(NS1’) ‘Bew(G,H)→ H’ expresses an axiom, whenever we put particular sen-
tences at the places of ‘G’ and ‘H’ respectively.
The letters ‘G’ and ‘H’ in the axiom scheme ‘Bew(G,H) → H’ are schematic letters
which can be replaced by particular sentences yielding particular axioms. But this does
not seem to be the correct reading of what Frege has in mind with his (NS1). As mentioned
earlier, the kind of signs which can occur in some specific theory are limited to the
signs with a determinate meaning (such as the one-place predicate expression ‘ξ is a
point’ in geometry or the two-place predicate expression ‘ζ is inferable from ξ’ in the
new science) and variables. But schematic letters seem to be neither. According to Frege
generality should always be expressed by means of quantifiers.85 So it seems that the
correct formalization of (NS1) should be something like this:
84The fact that in the context in question extensionality apparently fails, does not show that thoughts must
be considered as the objects to which the predicate ‘Bew(ξ, ζ)’ applies (and not the sentences expressing these
thoughts). The decision, that sentences are not the objects to which ‘Bew(ξ, ζ)’ applies has already been made.
The point is rather that there is a natural explanation of this apparent failure within a Fregean view on logic,
language and semantics.
85This view could be challenged on the ground that Frege did use schematic letters in the exposition of his formal
systems. In his Begriffsschrift for instance Frege uses letters ‘a’ or ‘b’ to state axiom schemes like ‘a→ (b→ a)’
(for the propositional fragment of his system) or letters like ‘f ’ to mark a function as in ‘(∀a)fa → fb’. Clearly
Frege uses ‘schematic letters’ in this sense. (In fact, some scholars like Warren Goldfarb think that even this use
of schematic letters is foreign to Frege and e.g. ‘a → (b → a)’ should be read as ‘(∀a)(∀b)(a → (b → a))’. see
his [12]) But this sense of ‘schematic’ has to be distinguished from the sense in which this word is used in the
above mentioned axiom scheme of the ‘new science’. Schematic letters of the former kind are necessary for the
exposition of a formal system of logic like the propositional calculus or quantification theory. They are used to
mark propositional (or quantificational) structure but they do not occur in sentences of some specific theory like
geometry or number theory (obviously ‘∀x(x < 1 ∨ a)’ for instance is not a well-formed sentence of arithmetic).51
(NS1”) (∀G)(∀H)(Bew(G,H)→ Tr(H))
But this is a new situation: Up to now we have just explained how we can talk about
particular thoughts, namely by noting that ‘Bew(ξ, ζ)’ provides an opaque context. By
means of Frege’s theory of indirect reference we were able to explain our ability to refer
to thoughts and the apparent failure of extensionality within this context. But so far
nothing has been said about quantifying into such contexts.86
There are several problems to be solved in order to make sense of Frege’s proposal con-
cerning independence proofs, but some of the most crucial ones have to do with the cases
of oratio obliqua that occur within metatheoretical investigation and the fact that, ac-
cording to Frege, quantification over senses is required in order to state general principles
governing his new science.
Although Frege doesn’t mention the problems of intensional logic explicitly in his 1906
article, I think this might have been one important reason why he raised some doubts
about the feasibility of his own proposal and not just specific worries concerning the
‘logical constants’ or the question what counts as a ‘logical inference’ or ‘logical law’.
This is not to say that these are not problems for Frege. On the contrary, as he puts it
in the 1906-article:
In particular, we will find that this final basic law [the law of the ‘eﬄux of
the formal nature’] which I have attempted to elucidate by means of the above
mentioned vocabulary still needs more precise formulation, and that to give
this will not be easy. Furthermore, it will have to be determined what counts
as a logical inference and what is proper to logic. If, following the suggestions
But (NS1) above is indeed meant to express a particular basic truth of the ‘new science’ -– a truth about all
thoughts.
86Also note that in regarding (NS1) as a quantified sentence, the truth predicate occurs ineliminably on pain
of ungrammaticality. It is precisely with (referential) quantification that the truth predicate becomes necessary.
One might circumvent the use of a truth predicate by invoking substitutional, rather than referential quantifiers.
But most commentators seem to agree that Frege’s first-order quantifiers must be interpreted referentially. So
substitutional quantifiers do not present an alternative, for thoughts clearly seem to be first-order entities. Note
though that nothing in the following depends on the question if Frege was aware of the fact that an ineliminable
truth predicate is needed in order to state general principles of the new science.
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above, one wanted to apply this to the axioms of geometry, one would still need
propositions that state, for example, that the concept point, the relation of a
point’s lying on a plane, etc. do not belong to logic. These propositions will
probably have to be taken as axiomatic.
So it is true that Frege regarded the problem of delineating ‘what belongs to logic’
as a pressing one, but it seems to me highly unplausible that this was his only worry.87
Recall that he explicitly states what he thinks is ‘new’ in the new science: the difference
between the new science and its older siblings like geometry or number theory lies in the
subject matter of these sciences. The new science is about thoughts in just the same way
as geometry is about points and arithmetic about numbers.
Frege’s axiomatic approach together with his commitment to thoughts as the sub-
ject matter of metatheoretical investigation and the requirement that the new science
should be general therefore presupposes a fully developed ‘intensional logic’ and most
importantly, it presupposes a semantic theory, which explains how quantification works
when intensional objects come into play. Moreover, given Frege’s continual complaints
throughout the 1903-1906 papers about Hilbert’s deviant use of the word ‘axiom’ and
his expressed point of view, according to which an ‘axiom in the traditional sense’ is a
thought, it seems to me highly unlikely that Frege was not aware of the fact that dealing
with such entities requires far-reaching amendments to his Begriffsschrift. To repeat the
central point: ‘with this question [the question of independence of thoughts] we enter into
a realm that is otherwise foreign to mathematics. For although like all other disciplines
87The problem of the logical constants and ‘what is proper to logic’ has been particularly emphasized in [26].
The problem is of course that it may create undergeneration if we declare a form of inference (or some notion) to
be logical if ‘in fact’ it is not. If we take a particular formalization of logic – say the logic of Begriffsschrift – as a
basis for a definition of the inferability-relation, we may ‘miss’ some logical inferences. That is, it might happen
that we declare some thought not to be inferable from some set of thoughts although ‘in fact’ they are. (As a
matter of fact, overgeneration cannot be ruled out either, as the dramatic case of Basic Law V showed.) On the
other hand, Antonelli and May 2000 have proposed a method to define the logical constants and the concept of
logical truth by adapting Frege’s ‘permutation argument’, a method which, according to Antonelli and May, could
have been known and accepted by Frege. From this they conclude that Frege’s expressed skepticism concerning
independence proofs was not warranted, for they seem to believe that this was the only problem Frege saw with
respect to independence proofs.
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mathematics, too, is carried out in thoughts, still, thoughts are otherwise not the object of
its investigations’. So it seems to me that the fact that Frege has not given these matters
enough thought, might to some extent explain his cautious stance towards independence
proofs.
2.4 Conclusion
The conclusion we reached might at first glance seem rather poor; after all, Frege makes
clear from the outset that the relation of dependence (or inferability as I called it) is a
relation that holds between thoughts and not the sentences expressing these thoughts.
As thoughts are intensional objects, the claim that independence proofs require some
kind of intensional logic seems to be trivial. Nevertheless, I think it is worth stating this
fact explicitly because most of the discussion on Frege’s proposed method for proving
independence seems to neglect it.88 The fact that Frege views thoughts as the objects
of metatheoretical investigation is often treated as an inessential peculiarity which need
not be taken seriously. But this view cannot be sustained if we take into account that
Frege wants to establish the new science as an axiomatic theory with its own axioms and
basic concepts. If the new science is worked out in this way, it will become apparent that
Frege’s conviction that thoughts are its objects is highly non-trivial.
Another thing to remark concerns the role of the theory of indirect reference with
regard to some of the problems that occur in connection with the new science. Remember
that the theory of indirect reference is capable of explaining how reference to thoughts is
achieved in particular metatheoretical statements. Furthermore, by invoking the theory of
indirect reference we were able to give an account of the apparent failure of extensionality
in the context ‘Bew(ξ, ζ)’. It was central to this task to recognize that ‘Bew(ξ, ζ)’ provides
an opaque context and is therefore subject to the theory of indirect reference. From this it
becomes apparent that there is a kind of ‘systematic stringency’ in Frege’s stance towards
metatheory. Hence, we may take the theory of indirect reference to elucidate how Frege’s
conviction that thoughts are the objects of metatheoretical statements fits in with his
more general views on logic and language.
88A notable exception is provided by [2] and [3]. I think an explicit formulation of Frege’s views on intensional
logic might also throw some light on Blanchette’s ‘analysis-problem’.54
Nevertheless, the theory of indirect reference as developed by Frege himself is not
sufficient to explain the generality involved in (at least some) statements of the new
science. In fact, in the presence of quantifiers it seems to create serious problems, even if
(NS1”) above is dropped in favour of some schematic version. The problems that occur are
analogous to the well-known problems with the interpretation of sentences like ‘(∃x)(x is
human and Martin believes that x is taller than 3 metres)’ where the first occurrence of the
variable ‘x’ lies outside the context ‘Martin believes that ξ’, whereas the second occurrence
lies within this context. Similarly, cases like ‘(∃x)(x is a number and Bew(AR, x < 1))’
(where AR stands for some arithmetical theory), where it is not clear what the range of
the variables should be taken to be, cannot be ruled out from the outset. If we expand
the theory of indirect reference to include quantification, it will become difficult to give a
satisfactory semantical theory which accounts for such sentences. Recall that the theory
of indirect reference makes the reference of an expression context-dependent and this will
carry over to variables that are bound by quantifiers.89
A second way to deal with intensional entities would be to drop the theory of indirect
reference altogether and adopt a method of direct discourse along the lines of Church’s
‘logic of sense and denotation’, where reference to intensional entities is achieved by new
expressions of the kind ‘the sense of the expression ξ’. This strategy, which Frege seems
to have favoured later, (as a letter to Russell suggests90) has the advantage that reference
is no longer context-dependent, for we no longer use the same signs for different referents
in transparent vs. opaque contexts. But there are still huge obstacles in making full sense
of this suggestion.91
It should also be borne in mind that, according to Frege, there is no prima facie prob-
lem in considering thoughts as objects of investigation. This is clear for instance from
89Again, the problem seems not to arise if we assume that the first-order quantifiers are interpreted substitu-
tionally rather than referentially, for then a sentence like ‘∃x(φ(x)∧ψ(x))’ (where φ(x) is a transparent and ψ(x)
an opaque context) is true just in case there is a name ‘a’ in the language in question such that ‘φ(a) ∧ ψ(a)’ is
true, and this case can be dealt with in a ‘standard way’ by the theory of indirect reference.
90In the letter from December 28, 1902 Frege writes: ‘Eigentlich mu¨sste man ja, um Zweideutigkeit zu vermeiden,
in ungerader Rede besondere Zeichen haben, deren Zusammenhang mit den entsprechenden in gerader Rede leicht
erkennbar wa¨re.’ [10], p. 236
91See [19] for a formal development of Fregean ideas along these lines.
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his reaction to Russell’s ‘second paradox’ (nowadays called ‘Russell-Myhill-Paradox’), the
paradox concerning sentences expressing the ‘logical product’ of some class of proposi-
tions.92 Frege does not find anything particularly ‘wrong’ with considering classes of
propositions (or ‘thoughts’ as he would say) or sentences expressing the ‘logical product’
of such a class. It is just that he is not satisfied with Russell’s presentation of the paradox,
which, in Frege’s eyes, lacks the stringency of the notorious ‘first paradox’ concerning the
class of all classes not being members of themselves.93 The reason for this is not hard
to find: It is a paradox about intensional entities and Frege has no idea what a ‘proof’
involving such entities might look like94, i.e. he has no idea of how the paradox (if it is
one at all) might even be formulated properly. That is, the problem is not that Frege
thinks that quantification over senses is somehow ‘weird’. It’s just that he hasn’t so far
thought through the matter carefully enough. And this surely remains the case until his
1906 paper on geometry.
So in any case, all the problems of intensional logic aﬄict metatheoretical reasoning —
a fact that Frege must have been aware of. Recall that Frege is very concious in declaring
intensional entities as the objects of metatheoretical investigation.95
92The paradox arises if we consider the class of all propositions: we can now consider arbitrary subclasses and
with any such class of propositions we can correlate a sentence which says that every proposition in this class is
true. Any of these propositions is in its correlated class or it is not. Now consider the class A consisting of all
and only the propositions which are not in their correlated class. The proposition which is correlated with the
class A is then in A if and only if it is not. For more on this paradox see Myhill’s classical [22] and [19].
93See Frege’s correspondence with Russell in [10], pp. 230-242
94Frege expressly asks Russell by which form of inference (‘Schlussweise’) exactly he got to his ‘second paradox’.
See [10], p. 237.
95Although my main aim in this paper was to give an explanation – or at least a partial explanation – of
Frege’s reluctance to fully endorse his method of proving the independence of genuine axioms in his 1906-paper
on geometry, it seems plausible to assume that if Frege had worries about intensionality in 1906, these worries
would have persisted until 1910. Hence keeping this point in mind might also throw some light on his notorious
remark in his notes on Jourdain as well: ‘The unprovability of the axiom of parallels cannot be proved. If we do
this apparently, we use the word “axiom” in a sense quite different from that which is handed down to us.’ (‘Die
Unbeweisbarkeit des Parallelenaxioms kann nicht bewiesen werden. Wenn man es scheinbar thut, gebraucht man
das Wort ‘Axiom’ in einer von der u¨berlieferten ganz verschiedenen Bedeutung. (Vergleichen Sie meine Aufsa¨tze
Ueber die Grundlagen der Geometrie im 15. Bd. d. Jahresber. der Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung.)’ ([10]
p. 119)) Commentators have often been baﬄed about this remark, for it seems to be in direct opposition to the
fact that, at the end of his 1906-article, Frege actually presented a proposal how to prove the independence of
56
So in conclusion we have the following: although there was no need to introduce inten-
sional logic for Frege’s logicist project of deriving number theory from logical principles
alone, there is a strong need to do so for an adequate treatment of metatheoretical ques-
tions (according to Frege’s standards) like the question of the independence of axioms from
one another. What has to be introduced, therefore, is a deductive system and semantics
for quantified intensional logic to deal with the opacity occurring in metatheoretical inves-
tigations. Moreover, as I have tried to argue, because of Frege’s emphatic commitment to
thoughts as bearers of the (in-)dependence-relation, it seems highly implausible to assume
that Frege was not aware of this fact.
It is plain that Frege’s conception of metatheory as developed in his U¨ber die Grundla-
gen der Geometrie is rather different from the current one. Here I am not trying to answer
the question if the Fregean conception of metatheory could (at least to a certain extent)
genuine axioms. Tappenden on the other hand has tried to accomodate this passage with the 1906-article. His
main argument is that Frege is not rejecting independence proofs tout court, but only independence proofs which
rest on the possibility of supposing an axiom to be false, which, according to Frege, would be incorrect. Tappenden
further argues that this reading would be suggested by the context surrounding the ‘Jourdain-sentence’, which
is about Frege’s view that something can be inferred only from premises which are known to be true. (See his
[32]). Although I think that Tappenden is right on this point, it seems to me that this is only half of the truth.
I agree that the context surrounding the remark suggests that in this passage Frege is indeed concerned only
with a certain type of independence proofs, independence proofs which are not even concerned with ‘genuine
axioms’ from Frege’s point of view. On the other hand, one would expect that, if Frege in 1910 fully endorsed his
1906-method to prove the independence of genuine axioms, he would set things right and show how independence
of genuine axioms could be proved according to him. But he only reiterates his 1906 diagnosis that independence
proofs involving the supposition of an axiom to be false rest on a misuse of the word ‘axiom’ and refers back to his
1906-article. But note that in doing so, he also seems to refer back to the doubts expressed therein. Remember
that the issue of independence proofs remained unsettled in the 1906-paper. Hence, even if Frege in the quoted
passage only rejects a certain kind of independence proofs, this does of course not imply that he now fully endorsed
his 1906-proposal. If, as I argued, problems concerning intensional objects were among the worries in 1906, then
his 1910-reference to the 1906-paper seems to refer to the same worries. For neither did Frege anything in the
direction of delineating ‘what belongs to logic’ nor did he make any serious attempts to make explicit his views on
(intensional) semantics. And indeed his expressed remark that ‘if we do this apparently, we use the word “axiom”
in a sense quite different from that which is handed down to us’ seems to hint exactly in this direction, for again,
it was a central point of the 1906-article that axioms are thoughts and hence proving independence of axioms is
proving something about thoughts.
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be ‘reconciled’ with the current one or if – for whatever reason – Frege was ‘blocked’ from
doing metatheory properly. The question if Frege was or was not able to do ‘genuine
metatheory’ therefore remains untouched by what has been said in this paper.
References
[1] Antonelli A., May R. 2000. ‘Frege’s new science’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic, 41 (3), 242-270
[2] Blanchette P. 2007. ‘Frege on consistency and conceptual analysis’, Philosophia
Mathematica, 15 (3), 321-346
[3] Blanchette P. 1996. ‘Frege and Hilbert on consistency’, The Journal of Philosophy
93 (7), 317-336
[4] Dummett M. 1973. Frege: Philosophy of language, London: Duckworth
[5] Frege G. 1879. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsa¨tze, edited by Angelelli I.,
Hildesheim: Olms [1964]
[6] Frege G. 1893-1903. Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Hildesheim: Olms, [1998]
[7] Frege G. 1903. ‘U¨ber die Grundlagen der Geometrie’, Jahresbericht der Deutschen
Mathematiker-Vereinigung, XII, 1903, translated and edited by Eike-Henner W.
Kluge, On the Foundations of Geometry and Formal Theories of Arithmetic, New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971
[8] Frege G. 1906. ‘U¨ber die Grundlagen der Geometrie’, Jahresbericht der Deutschen
Mathematiker-Vereinigung, XV, 1906, translated and edited by Eike-Henner W.
Kluge, On the Foundations of Geometry and Formal Theories of Arithmetic, New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971
[9] Frege G. 1892. ‘U¨ber Sinn und Bedeutung’, Zeitschrift fu¨r Philosophie und
philosophische Kritik, reprinted in Textor M. Funktion - Begriff - Bedeutung,
Go¨ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002
[10] Frege G. Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel, edited by Gottfried Gabriel et. al., Ham-
burg: Felix Meiner Verlag [1976]
58
[11] Greimann D. 2007. ‘Did Frege really consider truth as an object?’, Grazer
Philosophische Studien 75, 125-148
[12] Goldfarb W. 2005. ‘Frege’s conception of logic’, in E. Reck and M. Beaney, Gottlob
Frege: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, New York: Routledge 2005
[13] Heijenoort J. 1967. ‘Logic as Calculus and Logic as Language’, Synthese 17 (1),
324-330
[14] Hendricks et. al. (eds). 2004. ‘First-Order Logic Revisited’, Berlin: Logos Verlag
[15] Hilbert D. 1899. Grundlagen der Geometrie, Leipzig: Teubner Verlag [1923]
[16] Hintikka J. 1988. ‘On the Development of the Model-theoretic Viewpoint in Logical
Theory’, Synthese 77, 1-36
[17] Hodges W. 2004. ‘The Importance and Neglect of Conceptual Analysis: Hilbert-
Ackermann iii.3’, in Hendricks et. al. (eds): ‘First-Order Logic Revisited’, Berlin:
Logos Verlag
[18] Kambartel F. 1976. ‘Frege und die axiomatische Methode. Zur Kritik mathematik-
historischer Legitimationsversuche der formalistischen Ideologie’, in Schirn M. (ed.):
Studies on Frege I: Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics, Stuttgart: Friedrich From-
mann Verlag, Gu¨nther Holzboog GmbH & Co, 215-228
[19] Klement K. 2002. Frege and the Logic of Sense and Reference, New York & London:
Routlegdge
[20] Kluge E. (ed.) 1971. On the Foundations of Geometry and Formal Theories of Arith-
metic, New Haven and London: Yale University Press
[21] Korselt A. 1903. ‘U¨ber die Grundlagen der Geometrie’, Jahresbericht der Deutschen
Mathematiker-Vereinigung, XII, translated and edited by Eike-Henner W. Kluge,
‘On the Foundations of Geometry and Formal Theories of Arithmetic’, New Haven
and London: Yale University Press, 1971
[22] Myhill J. 1958. ‘Problems Arising in the Formalization of Intensional Logic’, Logique
et Analyse 1, 78-83
59
[23] Reck E. (ed.) 2002. From Frege to Wittgenstein: Perspectives on Early Analytic
Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press
[24] Reck E. and Beaney M. (eds.) 2005. Gottlob Frege: Critical Assessments of Leading
Philosophers, New York: Routledge
[25] Resnik M. 1974. ‘The Frege-Hilbert Controversy’, Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 34 (3), 386-403
[26] Ricketts T. 1997. ‘Frege’s 1906 Foray into Metalogic’, Philosophical Topics 25 (2),
169-188
[27] Sluga H. 2007. ‘Truth and the Imperfection of Language’, Grazer Philosophische
Studien 75 (1), 1-26
[28] Sluga H. 2002. ‘Frege on the Indefinability of Truth’, in E. Reck (ed.), From Frege to
Wittgenstein: Perspectives on Early Analytic Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University
Press
[29] Stanley J. 1996. ‘Truth and Metatheory in Frege’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
77 (1), 45-70
[30] Textor M. (Ed.) 2002. Funktion - Begriff - Bedeutung, Go¨ttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht
[31] Tappenden J. 1997. ‘Metatheory and Mathematical Practice in Frege’, Philosophical
Topics 25 (2), 213-264
[32] Tappenden J. 2000. ‘Frege on Axioms, Indirect Proof, and Independence Arguments
in Geometry: Did Frege reject Independence Arguments?’, Notre Dame Journal of
Philosophy 41 (3), 271-315
[33] Wehmaier K. 1997. ‘Aspekte der Frege-Hilbert-Korrespondenz’, History and Philos-
ophy of Logic 18, 201-209
60
3 Frege’s On the Foundations of Geometry and Axiomatic Metathe-
ory
Abstract.96 In a series of papers, dating from 1903 - 1906, Frege criticizes
Hilbert’s methodology of proving the independence and consistency of various
fragments of Euclidean geometry in his Foundations of Geometry. In the final
part of the last paper, Frege makes his own proposal how the independence
of genuine axioms has to be proved. According to Frege, independence proofs
require the development of a “new science” with it’s own basic truths. The
main purpose of this paper is a reconstruction of this “new science” and an
examination of possible problems surrounding Frege’s proposal. The strategy
for this will be twofold: the reconstruction should draw attention to important
connections to 20th century logical theory, while staying as close as possible with
Frege’s own views. The paper is organized as follows: in the first two sections
the main points of the Frege-Hilbert Controversy are set forth and some issues
surrounding the problem of independence proofs are discussed. Section 3 will
contain an informal presentation of Frege’s proposal, whereas section 4 sets out
a more detailed reconstruction of what Frege’s “new science” might have looked
like. The concluding section is devoted to a discussion of Frege’s general strategy
of proving the independence of genuine axioms.
3.1 The Foundations of Geometry : Frege and Hilbert on Independence
proofs
Hilbert’s Foundations of Geometry (1899) is often – and rightly – seen as a landmark
in the development of the so called axiomatic method. One of the main innovations in
Hilbert’s Foundations is that metatheoretic issues such as the questions of consistency
and independence of axioms are for the first time systematically treated in a way that
has since then become standard. In a famous letter to Frege he writes:
I was forced to construct my system of axioms by the following necessity: I
96This paper has been submitted for publication in Mind. Date of submission: 1st October 2012.
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wanted to provide an opportunity for understanding those geometric proposi-
tions which I consider to be the most important products of geometric inves-
tigations – that the axiom of parallels is not a consequence of the remaining
axioms; similarily the Archimedean axiom; etc. I wanted to answer the ques-
tion whether it is possible to prove the proposition that two equal rectangles
having the same base line also have equal sides. In fact, I wanted to create the
possibility of understanding and answering such questions as why the sum of
the angles of a triangle is two right angles and how this fact is related to the
axiom of parallels. ([28] p. 10)
Hilbert’s perspective in this passage is of decidedly metatheoretical character in the
sense that questions about what can and what can not be proved from some given set of
axioms, are posed from a point of view external to geometrical investigations properly so
called. The purpose of Hilbert’s axiomatization of geometry in his Festschrift therefore
was not just to provide a basis for geometry from which every geometrical truth could
be proved, but rather it was from the very beginning aiming at metatheoretical proper-
ties of Euclidean geometry and subtheories of Euclidean geometry.97 In a similar spirit
he writes in a small paper titled U¨ber den Satz von der Gleichheit der Basiswinkel im
gleichschenklingen Dreieck (dating from the same period):
Unter der axiomatischen Erforschung einer mathematischen Wahrheit verstehe
ich eine Untersuchung, welche nicht dahin ziehlt, im Zusammenhange mit jener
Wahrheit neue oder allgemeinere Sa¨tze zu entdecken, sondern die vielmehr
die Stellung jenes Satzes innerhalb des Systems der bekannten Wahrheiten
und ihren logischen Zusammmenhang in der Weise klarzulegen sucht, dass sich
sicher angeben la¨sst, welche Voraussetzungen zur Begru¨ndung jener Wahrheit
notwendig und hinreichend sind. ([22] p. 119)
At the heart of Hilbert’s methodology lies his consequent — what has since become
to be known as — modeltheoretic approach to axiom systems. Geometric axioms are no
longer seen as true propositions which are immediate from our spatial intuition, but are
97This has been emphasized, among others, by Hintikka in his [23] and [24].
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now considered to be like conditions in being satisfied by some interpretations and not
by others. As Hilbert puts it in a famous letter to Frege:
But surely it is self-evident that every theory is merely a framework or schema
of concepts together with their necessary relations to one another, and that the
basic elements can be construed as one pleases. If I think of my points as a
system of other things, e.g. the system of love, of law, or of chimney sweeps
... and then conceive of my axioms as relations between these things, then my
theorems, e.g. the Pythagorean one, will hold of these things as well. In other
words, each and every theory can always be applied to infinitely many systems
of basic elements. ([28] pp. 13-14)
Hilbert’s modeltheoretic approach to axiomatic theories is the key for his independence
proofs, for it is clear that, in order to prove the unprovability of some proposition φ from
other propositions S, one cannot “go through” all possible proofs and check that none
of them is actually a proof of φ using only propositions from the set S.98 Hence, in the
absence of prooftheoretical methods properly so called, the only way to prove an axiom
φ to be independent from a group of axioms S is to produce a countermodel, i.e. an
interpretation, in which every axiom in the group S is true, but φ is false. The conceptual
presupposition for such a strategy seems to be that the domain of the theory S (i.e. the
set of objects the theory is supposed to talk about) and it’s basic concepts are free to be
reinterpreted. Roughly this means that, although one may have an intended interpretation
in mind when setting up the axioms, this intended interpretation is no longer privileged
among other interpretations that might satisfy the axioms. Intuitions about an intended
interpretation of some given discourse have only heuristic value in setting up the axioms
and drawing attention to possibly fruitful applications, but they are irrelevant as far as
the logical content of the thereby established axiomatic theory is concerned.
To get a feeling for Hilbert’s method, let us look at the following example from Hilbert’s
Festschrift : Here, Hilbert wants to show that the axiom of completeness is independent
from the rest of the axioms for Euclidean geometry. The axiom of completeness is a
maximal axiom and (roughly) states that the system of things the theory talks about (i.e.
98For a general discussion of the developement of model-theory see [7].
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points, lines) cannot be extended while still satisfying the remaining axioms. (If added to
the remaining axioms, the axiom of completenss therefore guarantees that the resulting
system captures the “usual” structure of Euclidean space up to isomorphism.) To show
that the axiom of completeness is independent along the lines indicated above, Hilbert
reinterprets the primitive concepts of Euclidean geometry as follows:
1. “a is a point” is reinterpreted by “a is a pair (x, y) of algebraic numbers, i.e. numbers
x and y that can be constructed by repeated applications of the four basic arithmetic
operations together with the operation |√1 + ξ2| from the number 1”
2. “b is a line” is reinterpreted by “b is the ratio (u : v : w) of three such algebraic
numbers”
3. “the point a is incident with the line b” is reinterpreted by “a is a pair (x, y), such
that..., b is the ratio (u : v : w)... and ux+ vy + z = 0”
It can be shown now that under this reinterpretation every axiom of Euclidean geome-
try, except the axiom of completeness, is satisfied. (Just add some non-algebraic number
and make sure to “close off” under the four basic arithmetic operations and the operation
|√1 + ξ2|.)
Before we can see more clearly what Frege’s troubles with this kind of independence
proofs was, let us first clearly state what is involved conceptually in independence proofs
a` la Hilbert.99
As far as Hilbert is concerned, an independence proof of an axiom φ from a set of
axioms S is supposed to show that neither φ nor ¬φ are provable from S, i.e. that no
sequence of logical inferences might bring us from S to φ or its negation.100 This is done
by doing two things: First by providing an interpretation I with respect to which all
axioms in S as well as φ come out true, and second by providing another interpretation J
with respect to which all axioms in S are true while φ is false.101 Here an interpretation
is specified by a set of objects D forming the domain of objects of the theory, together
99To keep things straight I will read Hilbert’s method in a more or less straighforward, modern way and ignore
certain deviations that seem to me irrelevant for the further discussion.
100This can be seen in various places, for instance [22], p. 24 and 26. or in his U¨ber den Zahlbegriff, [22], p. 242.
101Note that Hilbert in his Grundlagen der Geometrie had already shown the “first half” of an independence
proof for the axiom of completenss. This was done by showing that the axioms of Euclidean geometry are
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with a specification of the denotations of the primitive concepts over the given domain
D. Now, appealing to the informal concept of semantic consequence, φ is a semantical
consequence of S if and only if φ is true in every interpretation in which all the sentences
in S are true. Therefore, I witnesses that ¬φ is not a semantic consequence from S and
J that φ is no semantic consequence of S either. Summing up, on this straightforward
model-theoretic reading of Hilbert’s independence proofs, he is relying on
1. the informal notion of provability
2. the informal notion of an interpretation, and the notion of truth with respect to an
interpretation
3. the relation of semantic consequence, defined in terms of all possible interpretations
and
4. the soundness of the intuitive notion of proof with respect to the informal semantic
consequence relation
Hilbert, however, never adresses any of these presuppositions explicitly (at least during
his dispute with Frege and some time after) but instead takes them to be part of ordinary
mathematics. On Hilbert’s view of axioms as conditions, the independence of axioms
can be proved (and to this extent Frege’s reconstruction captures the essential point
of his 1900-conception of the axiomatic method) just like any universal statement is
refuted: namely by giving a counterexample. To prove that the sentence “Every continuous
function is differentiable” is false, just give an example of a continuous function which is
not differentiable. The same goes for the proposition “Every affine plane is desarguesian”
which can be shown to be false by providing an example of an affine plane in which
Desargues Theorem (or the condition corresponding to it) does not hold. The choice
of this example is no coincidence: those were the kind of questions Hilbert wanted to
adress102, questions that have been bothering geometers throughout the 19th century and
which he apprehends as pertaining to logico-methodological or “foundational” issues only
in a derivative sense. Hilbert’s mathematical viewpoint is echoed in his remark:
consistent by exhibiting an analytic interpretation in which all axioms (including the axiom of completeness) are
satisfied.
102See [39], [47], [46] and [18] for more on the mathematical background of the Frege-Hilbert dispute.
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So spielt denn in der neueren Mathematik die Frage nach der Unmo¨glichkeit
gewisser Lo¨sungen oder Aufgaben eine hervorragende Rolle, und das Bestreben,
eine Frage solcher Art zu beantworten, war oftmals der Anlaß zur Entdeck-
ung neuer und fruchtbarer Forschungsgebiete. Wir erinnern nur an Abels Be-
weis fu¨r die Unmo¨glichkeit der Auflo¨sung der Gleichungen fu¨nften Grades durch
Wurzelziehen, ferner an die Erkenntnis der Unbeweisbarkeit des Parallelenax-
ioms und an Hermites und Lindemanns Sa¨tze von der Unmo¨glichkeit, die Zahlen
e und pi auf algebraischem Wege zu konstruieren. ([22] p. 111)
I think the problems accompanying the problem of the independence of the axiom of
parallels in this paragraph make it reasonably clear that Hilbert thinks of independence of
axioms in a straighforwardly informal, mathematical way. The fact that Hilbert mentions
the independence of the axiom of parallels in one breath with the transcendentality of e
and pi clearly suggests this reading and shows his inawareness of the conceptual presup-
positions displayed by the items 1. - 4 above. Although Hilbert is very concious with
respect to the metatheoretical character of his overall enterprise, he is less clear about
what this might involve exactly. To make a long story short: Hilbert’s approach at the
time surrounding the appearance of his Foundations of Geometry seems to be that of a
working mathematician, who is not too worried about the problem of making precise the
basic ingredients of his methodology.
If Hilbert is viewed as a revolutionary, Frege, by contrast, can be considered a conser-
vative with respect to the axiomatic method. Frege time and again charges Hilbert for his
allegedly inappropriate use of the word “axiom”. For Frege, an axiom “in the Euclidean
sense” (a locution he uses over and over again) is a true proposition which cannot be
proved. That is, on Frege’s view, a proper axiom has a determinate content and says
something about a specific domain. Therefore an axiom can by fiat not shown to be false.
The notion of being false in an interpretation on the other hand, to which Hilbert alludes
to, has to be construed quite differently, for, according to Frege, a proper language leaves
no room for interpretation.103 In Frege’s eyes Hilbert’s geometrical axioms are at best
Pseudo-propositions, i.e. groups of signs that seemingly express particular thoughts but
103For more on Frege’s and Hilbert’s conceptions of language see [1], [7] and [18].
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do so only apparently, because the concepts that occur in them (like “point”, “straight
line”, “congruence” etc.) do not designate something specific. But for Frege not to des-
ignate something specific is not to designate at all. Frege consequently takes Hilbert to
conceive of the primitive concepts of his axiomatization of geometry as variables in dis-
guise and whenever a primitive concept is “reinterpreted”, what’s really going on is that,
according to Frege, a variable is instantiated by a meaningful concept ([28] p. 81). Let P
for instance stand for the axiom of parallels and Φ for the remaining axioms of Hilbert’s
axiomatization of Euclidean geometry. Following Frege’s reconstruction of what he takes
Hilbert to have in mind, we arrive at propositional functions P (X, Y, ...) and Φ(X, Y, ...)
corresponding to P and Φ respectively by substituting variables of the appropriate type
for the primitive concepts “point”, “straight line”, etc. What Frege takes Hilbert to have
proved then is that the universally quantified conditional
(A) ∀X∀Y...(Φ(X, Y, ...)→ P (X, Y, ...))
is not valid by constructing a counterexample, i.e. a sequence of concepts P ′, G′, ...
which yield a true antecedent and a false consequent when substituted respectively for
the variables X, Y, .... Hence, on Frege’s recommended reading of Hilbert’ method of
reinterpretion, “axioms” should explicitly be conceived as conditions expressed by for-
mulas containing free variables, yielding true or false propositions only when meaningful
concepts are substituted for these variables.104
Summing up, it can be said that neither was Frege stubborn in his critique of Hilbert
nor did he misunderstand what Hilbert was up to on a large scale: it’s just that he did not
have the same view of axioms and mathematical truth and — for reasons that hopefully
will become apparent — could not agree with Hilbert’s method (even in it’s reconstructed
form) as an adequate method to prove the independence of genuine axioms.
104As an aside it should be mentioned that this reconstruction of the axiomatic method (axioms as propositional
functions; theorems as consequens-parts of conditionals etc.) was extremely common at least until the thirties.
Much of the work on the axiomatic method done by Carnap in the late 20s for instance can be seen as a further
development of Frege’s principal reconstruction of Hilbert, incorporating even questions like that of categoricity
or completeness into this framework. (See in particular his [5]). Even Tarski, one of the founders of modern logic,
in his (admittedly popular) Introduction to Mathematical Logic proposed a reconstruction of axiomatics that is
nearly identical to Frege’s reading of Hilbert. See chapter VI of his [42].
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Each of these points is fairly well known, but do not yet constitute a substantial cri-
tique of Hilbert. The only thing we have seen so far is how Frege reconstructs what he
thinks Hilbert has shown and that he gives some recommendations concerning – what he
thinks is – the proper usage of the word “axiom”.105 Frege is claiming – correctly of course
– that Hilbert does not use the word “axiom” in the traditional but in a novel sense, one
which lacks in his opinion the clarity he wishes such a basic concept to have. But so far no
argument has been given why Hilbert’s methodology should be so fundamentally flawed
as Frege wants us to believe.106 So if these were the only criticisms of Hilbert, Frege’s
1906-paper should not have gotten the attention it, in my opinion, deserves.107 To see
what Frege’s real troubles with Hilbert’s methods were, recall that Frege was looking at
Hilbert’s Festschrift and it’s methodology with the eye of the logician (or at least one
eye). One has to remember that, at the time of the appearance of Hilbert’s Festschrift,
Frege had — unbeknownst to logicians, mathematicians as well as philosophers — already
revolutionized logic and developed a sophisticated system of conceptual innovations con-
cerning the basic notions of proof and inference. As I will try to show, Hilbert’s omissions
mentioned two pages ago are the target of a substantial critique of Hilbert and Frege’s
own proposal how independence should be proved in the case of genuine axioms will reveal
how to circumvent these problems while sustaining a traditional view of axiomatics.
But before we go on to look more closely on Frege’s suggested method, let me once
again dwell on one point: for Frege, but not for Hilbert there is a blatant difference
between genuine axioms, having a determinate meaning on the one hand, and — what
Frege calls — pseudo axioms on the other hand. According to Frege, pseudo axioms
are strings of signs which seemingly express particular thoughts but nevertheless contain
variables and must therefore be conceived as conditions. In Hilbert’s conceptual repertoire
105See for instance [8], [26], [35], [3] and [4].
106That Frege would have attacked a strawman in the case of the word “definition” seems to be even more
obvious: Frege of course did not seriously believe that Hilbert wanted to “define” the concepts “point” etc. in
the sense of explicitly define. Rather he could not accept his wide usage of the word “definition” just as he could
not accept his usage of the word “axiom”.
107Of course, even if these were in fact the only points Frege wants to call attention to, the paper would
still provide an important contribution in evaluating the historical triumph of Hilbert’s algebraic version of the
axiomatic method. For, if nothing else, Frege at least clearly apprehends Hilbert’s radical shift towards a new
conception of axiomatics. 68
on the other hand, genuine axioms in the Fregean sense no longer occur: they are replaced
by pseudo axioms. Axioms for Euclidean geometry or the natural numbers are now on a
par with “axioms” for groups, lattices or topological spaces. As a quick look in a modern
textbook shows, the mathematical community was glad in following Hilbert in this shift
in mathematical nomenclature. I will not discuss the widely ramified consequences of this
shift for the philosophy of mathematics (for clearly it is not just a shift in terminology),
but I simply want to point to the fact that for Frege the difference exists and is important.
As he puts it:
It must be noted that Mr. Hilbert’s independence proofs simply are not about
real axioms, the axioms in the Euclidean sense; [...] Instead, Mr. Hilbert appears
to transfer the independence putatively proved of this pseudo-axioms to the
axioms proper, and that without more ado, because he simply fails to notice
the difference between them. This would seem to constitute a considerable
fallacy. ([28] p. 102)
From Frege’s point of view Hilbert’s axiom system can be conceived of in both ways,
as a set of conditions or as expressing “axioms in the Euclidean sense”. Both views
have their merits (of course Frege would not recommend using the word “axiom” in the
former case), and the questions of independence between genuine axioms and axioms in
the algebraic sense are mutually connected — but they do not amount to the same thing
according to Frege.108 It is apparent from many of Frege’s writings, that he had a clear
picture of “algebraic” axiom systems. In a letter to Jourdain for instance, Frege writes:
Wenn man z.B. Untersuchen will, was aus den Gesetzen a+ (b+ c) = (a+ b) + c
und (a + b) + c = (a + c) + b folgt ganz unabha¨ngig von der gewo¨hnlichen Be-
deutung des Additionszeichens, so sollte man das Wort “Addition” und ebenso
das Zeichen “+” ganz vermeiden und die Gesetze so ausdru¨cken: f(a, f(b, c)) =
108As we shall see, Frege thinks that in proving that the axiom of parallels is independent from the rest of the
Euclidean axioms we have to consider judgements about inferences and truth. Frege’s reconstruction of Hilbert
on the other hand shows that this is not the case if independence is meant as Frege thinks Hilbert conceives of it,
for on Frege’s reconstruction of Hilbert, independence of the axiom of parallels from the other axioms is expressed
by the sentence ∃X∃Y...(G(X,Y, ...) ∧ ¬P (X,Y, ...)), which does not mention inferences or truth at all.
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f(f(a, b)c) und f(f(a, b)c) = f(f(a, c), b). Der Buchstabe “f” dient nun dazu,
die Betrachtung allgemein zu machen. ([12] p. 117)
This is of course just the view he advocates how Hilbert’s “axioms” for geometry should
be seen. The same view is indicated in a letter to Huntington, a well known protagonist
of the so called postulate theorists, which were known for laying down axioms for large
parts of mathematics.109
It is necessary to dwell on the distinction genuine/pseudo axioms, because even careful
writers on this issue sometimes mix things up.110 Keeping in mind this distinction is
important not just for a faithful interpretation of Frege, but necessary in evaluating (and
appreciating) his positive account on the problem of how to prove the independence of
genuine axioms.
3.2 Preliminaries to Frege’s “New Science”
Before looking closer at Frege’s own proposal how independence proofs should be handled,
it might be useful to look at some points surrounding this issue.
We have seen that one of the main targets of Frege’s criticism of Hilbert is the fact that
109See his letter to Huntington in [12], p. 90.
110To support his critique of Tom Ricketts, Jamie Tappenden for instance cites the following remark from
Frege’s Basic Laws Pt. II ([11], p. 534), in which Frege takes back what he had claimed earlier concerning the
independence of the clauses in his definition of a “Positivalklasse” in the main text:
It should not necessarily have been stated that the independence of the stated conditions from one
another could not be proven. It is of course conceivable that one could find classes of relations,
to which every condition would apply but one, and that every condition would fail in one of the
examples.
Tappenden comments on the passage as follows:
Here, Frege indicates that the independence (in the sense of ‘no derivation possible’) can be demon-
strated by producing a counter-interpretation. ([39] p. 216)
Keeping the distinction just explicated in mind, it seems clear to me that in this passage Frege is not talking
about what he later calls axioms in the Euclidean sense, but about conditions (“Bestimmungen”) in the sense
just elucidated. The passage is about the clauses of his definition of a “Positivalklasse” and it seems to me that,
according to Frege, the sense in which clauses in a definition can be said to be mutually independent must be
construed quite differently from independence of genuine axioms.
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according to Frege Hilbert’s independence arguments lack the kind of stringency which
he expects from an argument to count as a proof :
As it stands, we remain completely in the dark as to what he [Hilbert] really
believes he has proved and which logical and extralogical laws and expedients
he needs for this. ([28] pp. 111-112)
In particular Hilbert’s loose talk about interpretations, the appeal to the informal
semantical consequence relation and the assumption of informal soundness (with respect
to informal provability) seem to be what Frege has in mind here. It is obvious, at least as
far as the 1906-paper is concerned, that Frege does not find anything particularly wrong
with the mathematical content of Hilbert’s arguments but rather with their presentation
and the language in which they are stated (specifically the “interpretation-talk”). This is
not only indicated by his remark that “the question may still be raised whether, taking
Hilbert’s result as a starting point, we might not arrive at a proof of independence of
the real axioms” ([28] p. 103), but it is obvious from the idea lying behind his own
proposal. That is, Frege is not so much worried about the truth of the independence results
established by Hilbert, but with the means of establishing them. In particular, Frege, at
least in the 1906-paper, does not show any qualifications that proofs of independence
are somehow impossible.111 What is really at stake here is the form that independence
arguments concerning real axioms should take if they should count as genuine proofs. So
in order to assess Frege’s own proposal, something should be said about Frege’s notion of
proof.
It is a commonplace that the main aim of Frege’s invention of the Begriffsschrift was
the rigorization of the concept of mathematical proof. But it is a matter of controversy
as to what exactly Frege was up to, if his motivation was driven mainly by mathematical
111This seems to be in contrast with some of his remarks dating before and after the 1906-proposal. In a
letter to Liebmann from July 1900, he writes for instance: “Ich habe Gru¨nde zu glauben, dass die gegenseitige
Unabha¨ngigkeit der euklidischen Axiome [emphasis by Frege] nicht bewiesen werden kann.” ([12] p. 148) Another
famous quote can be found in Frege’s comments on Jourdain, where he explicitly states: “Die Unbeweisbarkeit
des Parallelenaxioms kann nicht bewiesen werden.” ([12] p. 119) I will not try to accomodate these remarks with
Frege’s 1906-proposal in this paper (which I think could be done). Instead I will focus on Frege’s positive account
of independence proofs in the 1906-article.
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or by philosophical interest. What Jamie Tappenden has called “the myth” is the view
that Frege’s foundational project was a natural continuation of the rigorization of analysis
starting with Cauchy and Weierstraß in the early nineteenth century. Just like Cauchy and
Weierstraß were interested in laying solid foundations for real analysis, Frege, according to
the “myth”, was interested in laying solid foundations for number theory. Philip Kitcher
on the other hand has argued that, unlike in the case of analysis, Frege with his attempt
to secure the foundations of number theory did not answer any pressing needs of the
mathematicans. The introduction of exact notions of limit, continuity, differentiability
etc. by Cauchy and Weierstraß in the case of analysis was driven by the simple need of
consistency. Intuivive analysis plainly lead to contradictions. The consistency of number
theory on the other hand was never seriously in question. Kitcher concludes that Frege
advanced an explicitly philosophical call for rigor [...] Instead of continuing a
line of foundational research, Frege contended for a new program of rigor at a
time when the chain of difficulties that had motivated the nineteenth century
tradition had, temporarily, come to an end. ([27] p. 268)
Whatever the motives behind Frege’s project were exactly, it seems to me that the
Kitcher-view is right in emphasizing what Frege himself did not get tired to emphasize:
that a central motive for introducing a Begriffsschrift was to delineate with absolute rigour
the philosophically motivated border between what can be known a priori and what can
be known only by appeal to intuition, between what is analytic and what is synthetic.
Important for our purposes is that whatever Frege’s goal for inventing the Begriffsschrift
was ultimately (besides the obvious one just mentioned), the means for establishing this
goal was a rigorization of what is involved in mathematical proof. Frege repeatedly
criticizes that all too often the mathematician is content when every step in a proof
is “obvious” (“einleuchtend”, [11] p. VIII), without checking what the source of this
obviousness is. Frege’s answer to this problem is well known: it was to devise a notion
of proof that is defined in purely syntactical terms, so that every form of inference has
its syntactical equivalent “on the paper”. This enables one not just to check a proof by
mechanical procedures, but also to evaluate on what premises a proof ultimately rests
upon, for what was previously only in the thinking mind of the mathematician and only
half-way expressed, becomes intersubjectively assessable. This is a commonplace, but a
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commonplace worth recapitulating in the context of the Frege-Hilbert controversy, which
is after all (at least in part) a controversy about proofs of a particular kind.
A second point has to be kept in mind: Frege criticizes Hilbert for taking pseudo-
propositions (i.e. conditions) as axioms, that is, strings of signs which only apparently
express thoughts, but which contain variables and consequently do not express thoughts
at all. Frege concludes that such conditions cannot serve as axioms if the word “axiom”
is taken in it’s traditional sense. But Frege goes one step further: he is claiming that
an axiom is a thought, i.e. it’s not just that for a string of signs to be an axiom-
candidate it is necessary to express a thought, but it is necessary for something to be
an axiom-candidate even to be a thought. That is, he is claiming that in considering
dependence or independence of genuine axioms we are concerned with thoughts as the
objects of investigation. For Frege sentences are just the audible or visible expression of
what is relevant to the question of (in-)dependence, and as such they only have physical
properties. As Frege puts it:
When one uses the phrase ‘prove a proposition’ in mathematics, then by the
word ‘proposition’ we clearly mean not a sequence of words or a group of signs,
but a thought: something of which one can say that it is true. [...] We have
to distinguish between the external, audible or visible which is supposed to
express a thought, and the thought itself. [...] no one wants to predicate this
independence of what is audible or visible. ([28] p. 101)
This is an important point for Frege which will occupy us later on.
One last word on the mathematical-vs.-philosophical-reading of the motivations ly-
ing behind Frege’s logicist project, which has been much investigated lately by Wilson,
Tappenden or Hallett in their [47], [46], [39], [40], [41] and [18] with respect to Frege’s
mathematical background. I think it’s of considerable importance to place Frege firmly
in the context of his mathematical environment. Let me mention just one example Mark
Wilson elaborates in some detail in two of his papers.112 It is well known that in the course
of his logicist project of deriving the basic truths of arithmetic from logic, Frege repeatedly
considered so called abstraction principles. Abstraction principles are first discussed in
112See his [47] and [46] for more on “extension elements”, as well as Halletts [18].
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his celebrated Foundations of Arithmetic where he contemplates on defining the natural
numbers by means of the following principle (nowadays called Hume’s Principle)113:
(HP)Nu(F ) = Nu(G)↔ F ≈ G
Here F and G are concept variables, the operator Nu stands for the number operator
applying to concepts and the relation ≈ stands for the relation of equinumerosity between
concepts which is straightforwardly definable in higher-order logic. HP therefore says
that the number of F ’s is equal to the number of G’s if and only if the F ’s and G’s are
equinumerous. Put slightly differently: HP states that concepts are counted as “equal” if
and only if they are equivalent modulo equinumerosity, so there is no difference between
the concepts “is a county of Austria” and “is a planet of the solar system” with respect
to cardinality ; all the differences are “abstracted away”. Hence, if HP could be justified,
the introduction of numbers as objects would be justified as well, for a term Nu(F ) could
then be seen as a name of an abstract object “generated” by abstraction.
Now it is well known that Frege was not satisfied with HP alone as defining the number
operator (and hence numbers as objects) for a peculiar problem now kwown as the “Julius
Cesar problem”.114 What is important for us is the context surrounding the discussion of
HP in the Foundations of Arithmetic. Frege spent a lot of effort in discussing a similar
abstraction principle which lies at the heart of projective geometry, viz. the principle
(DP) d(h) = d(g)↔ h||g
where g, h are variables for straight lines, d stands for the direction-operator and || for
the equivalence relation of parallelism between straight lines. DP therefore says that two
lines have the same direction if and only if they are parallel. This abstraction principle
was considered to be central for the foundations of projective geometry, for if it would fix
the reference of the direction operator — which, according to Frege, it does not for the
very same reason HP does not fix the reference of the number operator — it would once
and for all resolve the then salient issue of the so called points at infinity (the “points”
113[13], p. 74.
114However, a justification could be given with the help of a “super-abstraction principle” encompassing all other
abstraction principles, viz. Basic law V. With the aid of basic law V any abstraction operator O with respect to
some equivalence relation R can then be defined by O(a) := {b : aRb}.
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where parallel lines “meet”). Just like “number abstracts” Nu(F ) in the case of HP ,
“direction abstracts” d(h) could be seen as names of certain abstract objects that are
generated by identifying parallel straight lines. That is, via DP , talk about points at
infinity could be shown to be reducible to talk about straight lines, for points at infinity
could simply be identified with directions.
The point of this little digression is to make it vivid that Frege’s ideas concerning his
logicist program115 must be seen in the light of the broader mathematical context, in par-
ticular with respect to developments concerning the foundations of projective geometry,
which occupied the center stage of 19th century geometry. Even as early as 1972 in his
doctoral dissertation Frege wrote about the problem of the points at infinity ([14] p. 1),
and the problem of methodologically correct foundations of projective geometry occupied
him throughout his career as a mathematician.116
So I think it’s extremely important to look closely at Frege’s mathematical environment
to get a firm grasp of his thinking. Still, the relevance of such contextualization seems
to be limited in the particular case of an evaluation of his attitude towards independence
proofs and metatheoretic questions in general. The fifty-odd pages of his papers on the
foundations of geometry for instance, as well as Frege’s correspondance with Hilbert and
others on the issue, make it apparent that Frege has no “mathematical” complaints about
Hilbert’s Festschrift in the sense that an appeal to a shared mathematical background
could make the differences look less serious. Frege in fact rejects a whole lot of what (then)
contemporary “mathematical practice” consists in. One has to take only a quick look at
his Basic Laws Pt. II to get a feeling for his opinion on contemporary mathematicians. It
is a continual complaint throughout his career that mathematicians are all too often too
lazy about the foundations of their respective fields. So although Frege must be seen as
a child of 19th century mathematics and has to be placed within it’s tradition, he could
arguably considered one of it’s greatest foes too. For Frege “mathematical practice” is
115Recall that although insufficient to fix the reference of the number operator, HP still plays a major role in
Frege’s subsequent definition of the natural numbers.
116That Frege saw the methodologically correct foundation of projective geometry as an unsettled issue can be
seen from his correspondence with Moritz Pasch, in particular Pasch’s letter from the 17th of january 1905. (See
[12] p. 173). Although Frege’s part of the correspondence got lost, his main line of reasoning can be extracted,
to some extent, from Pasch’s letters.
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not sacrosanct. On the contrary, according to Frege, 19th century mathematics was in
a terrible shape, for it’s core discipline number theory was built upon a rotten footing
(mainly due to the bad influence of the “formal arithmeticians”). Again, when Frege says
such things he is looking at things with the sharpened eye of the entirely new discipline
he has re-invented, the discipline of logic.
3.3 The “New Science”
As I have emphasized earlier, Frege’s concerns should not be seen as a full-scale rejection
of Hilbert’s arguments. At the time Frege wrote his paper on Hilbert’s Foundations of Ge-
ometry, the independence of the axiom of parallels from the remaining axioms for instance
was as certain as something could be. Frege is neither questioning the independence it-
self nor the possibility of proving this fact. What is at issue here is rather what kind of
methods should be employed to obtain an acceptable proof of this well known fact. As
we have seen, Frege blames Hilbert’s independence proofs for either being misguided (in
case they are meant to apply to genuine axioms) or irrelevant (because the word “axiom”
is understood in the sense of “condition” and hence a proof of independence concerning
such conditions has no obvious bearing on the genuine axioms corresponding to them).
So the question is: what are the correct means to reach those well known results applying
to genuine axioms according to Frege’s standards?
Three committments concerning independence proofs are apparent from his outline
in the final part of his 1906-paper. The first has already been mentioned in the second
section: the kind of things we are concerned with, when we ask ourselves if some axiom
is independent of others, are thoughts. As Frege puts it:
What I understand by independence in the realm of thoughts may be clear from
the following. I use the word ‘thought’ instead of ‘proposition’, since surely it
is only the thought-content that is relevant, and the former is always present
in the case of real propositions – and it is only with these that we are here
concerned. ([28] p. 103)
Again, in Frege’s terminology “propositions” (“Sa¨tze”) are just “marks on the paper”
or “soundwaves”, and as such they cannot be said to be (in-)dependent just like tables or
chairs cannot be said to be (in-)dependent. It is just in virtue of it’s expressing a thought
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that a proposition becomes logically relevant in the first place.117
The second point concerns the question how independence of thoughts is defined –
roughly: is it defined semantically in terms of truth or is it defined proof-theoretically in
terms of inferences? This is Frege’s answer:
Let Ω be a group of thoughts. Let a thought G follow from one or several
thoughts of this group by means of a logical inference such that apart from the
laws of logic, no proposition not belonging to Ω is used. Let us now form a new
group of thoughts by adding the thought G to the group Ω. Call what we have
just performed a logical step. Now if through a sequence of such steps, where
every step takes the result of the preceding one as its basis, we can reach a
group of thoughts that contains the thought A, then we call A dependent upon
the group Ω. If this is not possible, then we call A independent of Ω. The latter
will always occur if A is false. ([28] p. 104)118
The talk about logical inferences makes it reasonably clear that Frege’s conception of
independence is meant in the sense of “Non-provability”. It must be mentioned, however,
that the concept of being provable employed here – that is, as applied to thoughts – must
not be confused with the relation of being derivable, which applies to sentences. (More
on this point later.)
The third point is related to an interesting general feature of Frege’s strategy and
reveals an important aspect every attempted interpretation of his stance towards inde-
pendence proofs – and in particular every attempted interpretation of his 1906 paper –
has to take into account. Let me quote the whole passage:
We now return to our question: Is it possible to prove the independence of a real
axiom from a group of real axioms? This leads to the further question: How can
117As far as the 1903 - 1906 papers are concerned, Frege never distinguishes clearly between expression-types
and expression-tokens. Throughout the 1906-paper the word “proposition” (“Satz”) is used in the meaning of
sentence-token. (See for instance [28] p. 101.) Frege, however, was aware of the distinction, as a letter to Dingler
shows. See [12] p. 35.
118Recall that for Frege axioms are true thoughts. Hence, if φ is an axiom, ¬φ will trivially be non-provable from
some given set of axioms Φ. More generally, no false sentence (or “thought”) can be provable from Φ, assuming
that the notion of proof is sound.
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one prove the independence of a thought from a group of thoughts? First of all,
it may be noted that with this question we enter into a realm that is otherwise
foreign to mathematics. For although like all other disciplines mathematics,
too, is carried out in thoughts, still, thoughts are otherwise not the object of its
investigations. Even the independence of a thought from a group of thoughts
is quite distinct from the relations otherwise investigated in mathematics. Now
we may assume that this new realm has its own specific, basic truths which are
as essential to the proofs constructed in it as the axioms of geometry are to the
proofs of geometry, and that we also need these basic truths especially to prove
the independence of a thought from a group of thoughts. ([28] p. 106)
Frege’s fortrightness about his suggested method of proving independence in this pas-
sage is striking: it reveals that Frege wants to establish independence of real axioms in
an axiomatic framework, i.e. by invoking basic truths about thoughts. As we shall see
shortly the main reason for bringing up such basic truths is to provide links between the
notions of provability and truth as needed in independence proofs. As I mentioned earlier,
one byproduct of Frege’s logicist project was the rigorization of the notion of mathemat-
ical proof, which was needed in order to trace back on which basic truths the truths of
arithmetic ultimately rest upon. So if non-provability of some axiom of others should be
capable of being proved, we have to ask the same questions for proofs of this kind too:
what are the basic truths about thoughts, truth and provability, which are needed in order
to prove non-provability of some genuine axiom from others?
In his outline Frege offers three axioms of what he calls the new science: let me quote
the whole passage again:
The basic truths of our new discipline which we need here will be expressed in
sentences of the form
If such and such is the case, then the thought G does not follow by a logical
inference from the thoughts A,B,C.
Instead of this, we may also employ the form:
If the thought G follows from the thoughts A,B,C by a logical inference, then
such and such is the case.
In fact, laws like the following may be laid down:
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If the thought G follows from the thoughts A,B,C by a logical inference, then
G is true.
Further,
If the thought G follows from the thoughts A,B,C by a logical inference, then
each of the thoughts A,B,C is true. ([28] p. 107)
(In what follows I will refer to the laws mentioned by Frege with NS1 and NS
′
1 re-
spectively.) As mentioned earlier, one thing that is missing in Hilbert’s exposition of his
independence arguments, even if his talk about interpretations, systems of things etc.
were reformulated in an acceptable way, is a link between the notions of truth with respect
to an interpretation and provability. One presupposition of Hilbert’s arguments, if they
are supposed to show independence in the sense of non-provability, is for instance that
the notion of proof employed therein is sound with respect to the notion of semantic
consequence, i.e. that everything provable from premises that are true in some particular
interpretation, is itself true in that interpretation. Both “basic laws” above are meant
to provide just this kind of missing link Hilbert would have needed as premises of fully
regimented proofs even if the informal notions of proof and semantic consequence would
have been spelled out.
Of course, the two laws Frege cites are clearly insufficient for independence proofs.
What then, is needed additionally in order to be able to carry out “gapless proofs” of
independence that will meet Frege’s Begriffsschrift-standard of proof? To see what Frege
has in mind, it should be recalled that Frege is clear about the fact that mathematically
speaking we do the same thing in proving independence of genuine axioms as in the case
of conditions, namely producing a counter-interpretation. It’s just that, due to Frege’s
views on language, the same mathematical idea must be implemented differently in the
case of genuine axioms.
To elucidate what he has in mind as a surrogate for the counter-interpretation method,
he wants us to conceive of a language, a whole consisting of meaningful expressions (that
is, expressions equipped with a fixed sense as well as a reference).119 Think of the lan-
guage of Euclidean geometry as an example of such a language. As Frege acknowledges,
119The relevant passage can be found in [28] pp. 107-110
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one might follow Hilbert in expressing the axioms of Euclidean geometry by means of
the primitive concepts “point”, “straight line”, “plane”, “congruence” and “between”.
Besides these primitive concepts the language includes the logical apparatus consisting of
variables, truth functional connectives and quantifiers. Frege then invites us to think of
the expressions of this language as forming a list of more and more complex expressions
built up from the primitive concepts by means of quantifiers and the truth functional
connectives.
Now Frege’s suggested new law amounts to the following: if we can couple each ex-
pression of such a list with an expression of another list, consisting of expressions of the
same language such that
1. every expression is coupled with an expression of the same grammatical category and
2. the logical expressions are coupled with themselves
then every valid proof containing only expressions of the first list can be converted into
a valid proof containing only expressions from the second list. To illustrate this simple
idea, consider the following sequence:
1 Every human is mortal
2 Sokrates is a human
3 If Sokrates is a human then Sokrates is mortal
4 Sokrates is mortal
This sequence of sentences constitutes a valid proof of the thought that Sokrates is
mortal from the premises expressed by the sentences 1 and 2. Now by replacing “human”
with “prime number greater than 2“, “mortal” with “odd” and “Sokrates” with “5” we
get to the sequence
1’ Every prime number greater than 2 is odd
2’ 5 is a prime number greater than 2
3’ If 5 is a prime number greater than 2 then 5 is odd
4’ 5 is odd
which is again a correct proof of the thought expressed by the last sentence from the
premises expressed by the first two sentences. Now this is indeed the simple idea lying
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behind Frege’s surrogate law that is needed for independence proofs: that a valid proof
remains valid if non-logical terms are replaced by other non-logical terms, as long as the
truth of the premises is not affected.
Note that Frege’s talk about “lists of expressions” and “coupling expressions with
expressions” can be straightforwardly restated in terms of a function t, “translating”
expressions of the first list into expressions of the second. Thus, slightly generalizing
on his key idea, Frege’s point can be made more precise by defining a Frege-translation
(henceforth F -translation) as a function t from a language L1 to a language L2 (possibly
distinct from the first one120) which meets the following conditions:
1. For every primitive predicate P in L1 there is some L2-predicate φP , s.t. t(P (x1, ...xn)) =
φP (x1, ...xn)
2. t(s1 = s2) = t(s1) = t(s2) for terms s1, s2
3. t(¬φ) = ¬t(φ) for every formula φ
4. t(φ→ ψ) = t(φ)→ t(ψ) for formulas φ, ψ
5. t(∀xφ) = ∀xt(φ) for all formulas φ121
The clauses in this definition are straightforward: 3 for instance states that the F -
translation of a negated sentence is the result of prefixing the negation sign to the trans-
lation of the original sentence. Similar for the other logical constants.
Now given some F -translation t, mapping expressions to expressions and thereby pre-
serving their logical structure, we can correlate a function st with t, mapping senses of
expressions to senses of expressions according to the F -translation t. Call such a function
a sense-translation (S-translation).
With these stipulations at hand (and employing the notation φ∗, referring to the
120In the relevant passage Frege writes: “Imagine a vocabulary: not, however, one in which words of one language
are opposed to ones of another, but where on both sides there stand words from the same language but having
different senses.” I am not entirely certain as to why Frege is here talking about one language, but as my main aim
in the following is the broader one of highlighting links to certain concepts and methods of modern mathematical
logic, I will simply skip this and other problems, at least if Frege’s main line of reasoning is not distorted.
121Similarly for higher order quantifiers.
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thought expressed by φ), Frege’s new law, which he calls an “eﬄux of the formal na-
ture of the logical laws” ([28] p. 107), can be stated as follows122:
If t is an F -translation then (if φ∗ is provable from the thoughts S∗, then st(φ∗)
is provable from st(S
∗))
Now suppose we want to prove that the thought φ∗ is independent from the thought
S∗, expressing the conjunction of some set of sentences S. Suppose further that φ and
S are formulated in a language L1 and we are given an F -translation t mapping the
primitive concepts of L1 to concepts of some language L2. As we have seen, t will induce
a function st mapping φ
∗ and S∗ to thoughts st(φ∗) and st(S∗) respectively. Furthermore,
suppose we could prove that st(S
∗) is true and st(φ∗) is false. Now if φ∗ were provable
from S∗, then, by the new law, st(φ∗) were provable from st(S∗) and hence true by the
soundness laws NS1 and NS
′
1, which it, by assumption, is not. Contradiction. Hence φ
∗
is not provable from S∗.
A lot of things a left open by this sketch at this point. An often-read complaint
about Frege’s suggested method is that he had no account of “what belongs to logic”.
As we have seen, Frege’s method relies on two things: First of all, dependence of (and
hence independence of) axioms was defined in terms of logical steps, which themselves
were defined via logical inferences and laws. So in order for his method to get off the
ground, as he explicitly acknowledges, Frege would have had to delineate what counts as
a logical inference and what the logical laws are. Secondly, his new basic law relies on the
notion of an F -translation, which in turn was defined as a function on the vocabulary of
a language which leaves logical constants fixed. So Frege should have been interested in
delineating more precisely 1. what the logical constants are and 2. what counts as logical
law/inference, for otherwise one would be left in the dark if his independence test yields
correct results.123
122The “law of the eﬄux of the formal nature” (and Frege’s suggested method to prove independence) has lately
been discussed in it’s relation to other informal metatheoretical principles such as duality principles in projective
geometry, in particular by Jamie Tappenden in his [39]. In what follows I will reconstruct what I take to be
Frege’s central idea concerning the new basic law in a way that is closer to concepts and ideas that have become
central in 20th century (mathematical and philosophical) logic.
123This point has been put forword especially by Tom Ricketts in his [37] pp. 149-150.
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Although this question is important, I do not want to discuss it in any further detail
and refer the reader to some of the relevant literature.124 (In fact, in the definition of an
F -translation given earlier it has been assumed that the logical constants are exhausted
by the identity-sign, the truth-functional connectives and universal quantification.) The
points I find most interesting in Frege’s proposal are of a more general methodological
character, so it seems to me that Frege’s suggestion bears a lot of interesting questions
even modulo the problem of “what belongs to logic properly”.125 Some of them shall be
discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
3.4 Frege’s New Science explicit
To get a better grip on what Frege is up to with his proposal, let us be a little bit more
careful in what follows. So for the following we will fix some system K of axioms and rules
comprising a codification of the “logical”. That is, we assume that it has been delineated
what the logical constants are and what laws and rules of inference are purely logical. For
124See Ricketts [37], Tappendens [39] for a reply and especially Antonelli/May’s [1] for more on the problem of
the logical constants.
125To delineate “what belongs to logic” is important though, for if no criterion of demarcation is provided, we
are left in the dark about the results generated by Frege’s (or anyone else’s) method of proving independence.
By way of a thought experiment, let us assume that someone would say that second order number theory would
be exactly what “belongs to logic”. If this were true, every number-theoretic statement would be a logical truth
and hence dependent on the logical laws; if it were false, number-theoretic statements would be independent of
the logical laws. So the problem is that overgeneration with respect to dependence may occur if we “falsely” take
some law or expression to be “logical” which it “in fact” is not (as in the dramatic case of basic law V which
Frege takes to be a logical law, but which allows us to prove everything), as well as undergeneration if we “falsely”
take some law or expression not to be logical if it “in fact” is. The problem here lies of course in making sense
of the locution “what is in fact logical”. It seems to me that there is no straightforward way to establish what’s
“logical” without recourse to stipulation at some point or recourse to philosophical arguments such as Frege’s early
“everything can be counted”-rhetoric in favour of the logicality of the concept of number. There simply seems to
be no criterion of “the logical” which meets everyones expectations. Hence one should not expect Frege to have
such a criterion of demarcation when no one has. Unlike most of his contemporaries, Frege at least adresses the
issue explicitly and it seems that he would have resolved this problem by stipulating axiomatically what’s logical.
“If, following the suggestions given above, one wanted to apply this to the axioms of geometry, one would still
need propositions that state, for example, that the concept point, the relation of a point’s lying on a plane, etc.
do not belong to logic. These propositions will probably have to be taken as axiomatic.”
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the sake of definiteness take K to be Frege’s system of his Begriffsschrift.126
Now if we look at the first two axioms Frege mentions (NS1 and NS
′
1) it is apparent
that three devices occur in them that do not show up in the system K (or in any of the
systems Frege ever considers as providing a basis for logic). First, he uses the locution
“the thought ...”, secondly, the predicate “... is true” and thirdly, the relation “... is
inferable from - - -”127. So in order to get gapless independence proofs we have to take
care of these notions first. For this purpose let p.q represent the 1-ary function mapping
an expression to the sense it expresses. Furthermore let T (x) stand for the truth predicate
and Prv(x, y) for the provability relation which is determined by the axioms and rules of
K. So if φ and ψ are sentences, Prv(pφq, pψq) is just an object linguistic expression of
the sentence “The thought expressed by ψ is provable from the thought expressed by φ
by means of the rules and axioms of K”.
Some qualifications concerning the proposed reconstruction of Frege’s new science
should be made before we go on: the first relates to the “basic law” NS ′1, which is
just an expression of his often articulated view that something can be proved only from
premises that are true. The reason for this is that, according to Frege, a genuine proof
should establish the truth of it’s conclusion, which of course requires the premises from
which it proceeds to be true. But this piece of Fregean doctrine should not prevent us
from construing the notion of provability in a way that dismisses the notion of truth al-
together. True: Frege conceives of the possibility of regarding proving as some kind of
“game” without paying attention to the truth of the premises — and openly rejects it!
But the sole reason for doing so is precisely because we would be left in the dark as to
the truth of thereby established conclusions.128 To keep things straight we will therefore
understand Prv(pφq, pψq) in a sense that excludes the necessary truth of φ, i.e. we will
126It seems that Frege, some time after receiving the letter from Russell, went back to 1879 and regarded
his Begriffsschrift-calculus, something akin to simple type theory, as codifying “what belongs to logic”. This is
indicated for instance by Carnaps lecture notes, dating from 1910 - 1914. See [6].
127This locution is to be understood in the sense of “... is inferable from - - - by a finite sequence of logical
inferences”.
128See for instance his letter to Dingler, [12] p. 30. Note also that there is a blatant difference between claiming
that proving theorems is comparable to playing some kind of game and the claim that proving theorems is nothing
more than a game. Frege would not object to the former, but of course reject the latter claim. For more on the
game analogy compare § 90 of the of his Basic Laws Pt. II.84
view the provability relation Prv(x, y) as solely depending on the notion of proof deter-
mined by the synatctical rules and axioms of K. This is not a serious departure from
Frege, for “Fregean provability” could still be defined explicitly via Prv(x, y) and the
truth-predicate by Prv(x, y) ∧ T (x).
Note that the object-linguistic concept of provability (i.e. the relation Prv(x, y)) as
construed here is, by assumption, dependent on – although not identical to – the notion
of derivation determined by the syntactically defined laws and rules of the given system
K. That Frege would agree with this reconstruction of the provability relation might be
seen as somewhat troublesome. Patricia Blanchette for instance writes:
For Frege, on the other hand, the question of whether a given thought τ is
independent of a collection Π of thoughts is the question of whether τ can
be obtained by Π by a finite number of valid steps of logical inference. And
while such a series of steps is straightforwardly a proof, it is not a proof in
any particular formal system. Frege’s question is not whether a given formula
is derivable from a set of formulas in e.g. the system of the Begriffsschrift
or Grundgesetze. It’s rather the question of whether a thought follows via
logical steps of logical inference from a collection of thoughts, independently of
whether there is available for our use a good codification in a formal system of
the inferential steps involved. ([2] p. 13)
To be sure: it is true that for Frege inferences (logical or otherwise) are not made
in the “realm of the visible”, i.e. by syntactical transformations. Synactically defined
transformation rules are just the expression of such inferences from the Fregean point
of view. But it is hard to find an essential difference between the notion of provability
(as applying to thoughts) and the purely syntactical notion of derivation if the formal
character of the logical laws and inferences in the realm of thoughts is to be upheld. Once
the logical laws and valid forms of inference are delineated and the question what belongs
to logic is settled (which we assume), there should be no question of whether these forms
of inference are codifiable by syntactically specified rules: they surely must be! It seems
odd to me (or to attribute such a view to Frege) to conceive of logical laws or rules of
inference which do not correspond to one or another syntactical rule “on the paper”, for
on such a view proofs would seem to become uncommunicable. Blanchette is surely right
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in claiming that for Frege a proof is not a proof in a particular system, but it seems
to me that he would agree that different systems codifying the same priorly delineated
realm of the logical, and thereby generating the same class of theorems (modulo notational
differences), should count as equal. Hence if, for systems K,K ′, we have φ `K ψ if and
only if φ `K′ ψ for every pair of sentences φ, ψ, both K and K ′ are equally adequate in
fixing the extension of the relation Prv(x, y).129
A second point concerns the choice of the primitives of the new science, in particular
the need of a truth predicate. As I see Frege’s axioms, those are meant to state something
about all thoughts and therefore should be stated explicitly by the use of quantifiers. I
have no knock-down argument for this reading, but it seems to be suggested by most of
his remarks concerning generality. One of these being his view that the principles/axioms
of some theory should be finite, thereby excluding axiom schemes altogether.130 So if it is
granted that the axioms of the new science should be read as quantified statements, there
seems to be no way to circumvent the use of a truth predicate on pain of ungrammaticality.
Keeping in mind these points the first axiom of the new science can be expressed by:
(NS1) ∀x, y(Sent(x) ∧ Sent(y)→ (Prv(pxq, pyq) ∧ T (pxq)→ T (pyq)))
where Sent is a predicate that defines the class of all sentences of the language of the
129Another question still, is the question if Frege’s notion of provability is in fact formal in any sense that
excludes semantical features, a question Blanchette would deny. On her interpretation, Frege’s concept of proof
is semantically laden. This is particularly important for independence proofs, for although syntactical derivability
might yield a positive test for provability of the corresponding thoughts, the fact that a sentence φ is not derivable
(regardless of how this might be shown) from a sentence ψ does not yield such a test for non-provability of the
corresponding thoughts. The reason for this is that the non-derivability of φ from ψ may depend on the particular
expression of the thoughts expressed by φ and ψ, resp. That is, there might be sentences φ′, ψ′ expressing the
same thoughts as φ and ψ, but for which φ′ is derivable from ψ′. For more on this topic see Blanchette’s [3], [4]
and [2].
130See his [13] p. 6. That is, what is excluded is to treat e.g. his soundness axiom as a scheme T (pφq) ∧
Prv(pφq, pψq) → T (pψq) which yields a particular instance only if particular sentences are put at the places
of the schematic metavariables φ, ψ. In fact, if “soundness” is treated schematically, it could be formalized
by φ ∧ Prv(pφq, pψq) → ψ. It is precisely with (objectual) quantification that the truth predicate becomes
ineliminable. Still, there is the possibility of viewing his quantifiers substitutional rather than referential. Another
one would be to treat his axioms as schematic rules of inference, but it seems to me that both options are not
particularly appealing from a Fregean point of view.
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theory to which the new science is to be applied.
Note that, if the truth predicate occurs ineliminably and turns out to be undefinable,
truths about this ineliminable notion must show up as further axioms. One must, for
instance, be able to prove that everything provable from some set of genuine axioms must
be provably true. Say, P stands for a sentence expressing the Pythagoras theorem: if
the new science is applied to geometry, we should for instance be able to prove T (pPq).
Furthermore, compositional axioms concerning the truth predicate must be available, that
is, truths like131
Tr¬ ∀φ ∈ Sent : T (p¬φq)↔ ¬T (pφq))
or
Tr∧ ∀φ, ψ ∈ Sent : T (pφ→ ψq)↔ (T (pφq)→ T (pψq))
Now the statement of the second basic law Frege mentions is somewhat more involved
and reveals an important presupposition for the Fregean approach altogether: Recall that
it amounts to the claim that the provability-relation is invariant under substitutions of
the non-logical vocabulary. More precisely it was stated in terms of F -translations, that
is, functions mapping the expressions (“words” in Frege’s terminology) of some language
L1 to expressions of some language L2 preserving logical structure. Such an F -translation
will induce a function mapping senses of expressions to senses of expressions. This is
important for Frege, for as we have seen, Frege thinks that thoughts are the kind of
things that can be proved to be independent from one another. It is important though
to realize that, although S-translations (relating senses to senses) are what is relevant
to independence proofs, these S-translations are parasitic on the syntactically defined F -
translations. There seems to be no obvious way to come up with an S-translation without
providing an F -translation which induces it. Frege seems to be fully aware of this: in
his informal presentation of the new law, “words” (syntactical items) are paired with
131It is well known that without restricting it in some way, such a theory of truth will be inconsistent due to the
liar-paradox. In fact, the liar paradox was (and still is) a major driving force for the development of consistent
theories of truth. (See Part I of [17] for further discussion of axiomatic theories of truth). Unfortunately there
seem to be no hints in Frege’s writings how the liar paradox is to be avoided or that he even considered it as a
major problem at all.
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“words”; it’s just in virtue of the fact that we are dealing with proper languages (that is,
fully interpreted languages) that thereby a pairing of senses with senses is induced.
Now the point I want to stress is rather simple: what is needed in order to even
formulate the new law NS2 (in fact even the first law NS1) is a theory of syntax, which
enables us to talk about linguistic items such as variables, names, expressions etc. and
which tells us how the expressions of some given theory to which the new science is to be
applied, are built up from the basic concepts by means of the quantificational apparatus.
By using expressions denoting syntactical objects, such a theory has to provide the means
to formulate and prove such basic facts regarding syntax. If, for instance, “Sent(x)” is
a predicate true of all and only the sentences of some given language L, “P” a primitive
concept of L, “◦” stands for the concatenation-operation of signs, and the bar is used as
a means to generate names for syntactical items, a theory of the kind required by Frege’s
method must prove, e.g., sentences like
Sent(P¯ ◦ x¯ ◦ →¯ ◦ P¯ ◦ x¯)
and
∀x(Sent(x)→ Sent(¬¯ ◦ x))
Given such a theory of syntax, one could then define an F -translation t by means of
clauses like
T¬ ∀x(Sent(x)→ t(¬¯ ◦ x) = ¬¯ ◦ t(x))
T→ ∀x∀y(Sent(x) ∧ Sent(y)→ t(x ◦ →¯ ◦ y) = t(x) ◦ →¯ ◦ t(y))
Note that a theory providing this kind of facts regarding syntax is quite strong. It is
not only “substantial” in a loose sense of “being about something”, but in the sharp sense
that it has ontological, as well as ideological import: it has ontological import because it
is committed to an ontology of expressions and second, as is well known, it contains (and
is contained in, as Go¨del showed) an arithmetical theory of some kind.132 133
132This has been shown by Quine in his [32].
133Although at this place it might seem somewhat anachronistic to speak of ontology, this point seems to me
important. It is not clear if, at the time of writing the last series of papers on the foundations of geometry, Frege
still held the view that there are logical objects, i.e. objects whose existence is implied by the basic laws of logic.
But if he did not (and this seems to be indeed the case), there seems to be no way to construe the new science as
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Furthermore, due to Frege’s committment to thoughts (senses of sentences) as objects
of metatheoretical investigation, a final presentation of Frege’s views on the matter would
have to include in addition a theory relating expressions to the senses they express, and
should make apparent how the sense of a complex expression is composed of simpler
senses according to its syntactical structure. Using “•” for the concatenation of senses
(whatever this exactly means), compositional truths of the following kind should be among
the consequences of the new science:
S¬ ∀x(Sent(x)→ p¬¯ ◦ xq = p¬¯q • pxq))
S→ ∀x∀y(Sent(x) ∧ Sent(y)→ px ◦ →¯ ◦ yq = pxq • p→¯q • pyq)
Plainly, given Frege’s committment to thoughts as objects of independence investiga-
tions, a theory of sense has to be given, not just for the specific reason of providing the nec-
essary links between the syntactical F -translations and their corresponding S-translations
on the level of sense: it is a simple lesson to be learned from Tarski’s painstaking accuracy
in setting up his truth definitions, that every theory of truth (and/or provability) has to
provide a theory of the objects that are deemed true (and/or provable).134 Obviously such
a theory of sense is no less “substantial” than the theory of syntax that is presupposed
in Frege’s proposal.
Now, suppose all this has been provided and the class of F -translations (from a lan-
guage L1 to L2) has been defined, say by TF . The new law that is needed in order to
prove independence along the lines Frege advocates, would then look something like this:
(NS2) ∀t ∈ TF : ∀x, y ∈ Sent : (Prv(pxq, pyq)→ Prv(pt(x)q, pt(y)q)
Now let’s pause for a moment and take a look at Frege himself. The reconstruction
so far has brought to light a bunch of collateral committments that come together with
Frege’s proposal. So one question would be: what are the committments that Frege is
aware of?
a part of “logic” (as it is insinuated for instance by Tappenden in his [39] p. 215), for the new science as required
by Frege clearly implies the existence of certain objects, viz. expressions. And, as we shall see, still more.
134In the context of axiomatic theories of truth, this point has been emphasized, for instance, by Halbach. For
further discussion on this point see the second chapter of his [17].
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The answer to this question is somewhat stuttering, but at least one point seems to
be clear from his 1906-paper: that Frege is aware of the fact that some kind of semantic
ascent is needed in order to prove rigorously the independence of genuine axioms. This
can be seen for instance from the passage already quoted:
although mathematics is carried out in thoughts, thoughts themselves are oth-
erwise not the objects of its consideration. Even the independence of a thought
from a group of thoughts is quite distinct from the relations otherwise investi-
gated in mathematics.
The same point seems to be at issue in his remark at the end of the 1906 paper where
he writes:
As long as the word “axiom” was used as a heading only, a fluctuation in it’s
reference could be tolerated. Now, however, since the question of whether an
axiom is independent of others has been raised, the word “axiom” has been
introduced into the text itself and something is asserted or proved about what
it is supposed to designate.
Frege’s dwelling on a clarification of what an “axiom” is and what the proper means
of establishing independence of axioms are, must be understood in the light of Frege’s
awareness that by trying to prove independence of genuine axioms we have to step beyond
the border of logical theory to meta-theory. Frege in the first place saw more clearly than
Hilbert — although still somewhat obscure — that there is such a border and that proving
things concerning this new field requires totally new concepts and methods.135
There is a final point which deserves closer attention. The new science as reconstructed
here, conists of a theory of syntax together with a theory relating this syntax of expressions
to the “syntax of sense” and axioms for truth and provability. But it is not clear at
this point that such a theory suffices to prove rigorously the independence of genuine
axioms. To be more precise, it is not clear if a new science comprising only of these
135Recall that this is not the case if “independence” is understood in the way Frege reads Hilbert, for on this
type-theoretical reconstruction independence-claims are just an elliptical way of expressing the negation of a huge
quantified conditional. It is just with Tarski’s strict separation between object- and metalanguage that this crucial
point had slowly been appreciated by the logicians.
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items suffices for proving independence of the axioms of an arbitrarily chosen system of
genuine axioms. The problem here is not specific to Frege’s approach, but is also implicit
in a modeltheoretical approach to independence proofs. Say, we want to show that φ is
independent from the system of axioms (or “conditions”) S. In order to do this we have
to show that there exists an interpretation M (where M = (D, I) for some set D and an
interpretation function I, providing extensional meanings for the non-logical vocabulary),
which satisfies all the axioms of S but which makes φ false. That is, we have to show
(Int) ∃M : (M satisfies S) and (M satisfies ¬φ)
Now the question is simply: where do we get the needed models M , witnessing such
an existential claim, from? The simple answer is: from wherever we please! An interpre-
tation is provided by any set of objects together with interpretations for the non-logical
vocabulary defined over this set. We just have to ensure that such a model satisfies S
and ¬φ. The default choice is of course to provide the required models by taking sets
of mathematical objects, such as sets of numbers. One reason for this is that, in doing
so, we can use mathematical methods to establish that M satisfies S and φ by standard
mathematical reasoning. Even more customary is it to provide the needed models by re-
sorting to some set theory. As it is possible to construct any mathematical model within
set theory, set theory is sometimes said to be the proper framework for model theory and
it is in this sense that model theory is sometimes regarded as set theory in disguise.
A similar question now arises for the translation-based method used by Frege as well.
Recall that, if we want to show that some genuine axiom φ is independent from genuine
axioms S, we have to show
(Trans) ∃t : (t(S) is true) and (t(¬φ) is true)
So in order for this method to work (which instead of the notion of truth in an inter-
pretation or satisfaction uses the absolute notion of truth simpliciter), we have to make
sure that the theory in which such a claim is to be proved, is sufficiently strong to provide
the right kind of rtranslations, for it is prima facie not clear, if truths about the syntax
of expressions and senses will suffice for this purpose.136
136In fact it does suffice in the case of first-order theories, but for a reason that is not entirely obvious. As has
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To recap the situation so far: after rejecting Hilbert’s informal independence proofs,
which rest — from Frege’s point of view — on a misconception of what axioms are, Frege
eventually scetches how he would prove independence of genuine axioms. The two main
features of this proposal are that proofs of independence proceed within an axiomatic
framework and are based on translations instead of interpretations. It has been shown
that, even if a solution to the problem of “what belongs to logic properly” were given,
there would have been a bunch of collateral problems surrounding Frege’s suggestion. For
one thing, substantial theories of sense and syntax would have to be provided as well as a
theory of truth and provability plus a theory providing enough translations ensuring the
correctness of independence results generated by this method.137
As I hope I have made clear, Frege’s axiomatic approach to independence proofs bears
some interesting ideas and relates to some of the most important topics in 20th century
logical theory. In the last section I will try to elucidate some of these connections a bit
further.
3.5 Axiomatic Metatheory
The reasons for axiomatizing some part of discourse are manifold, at least on the modern,
Hilbert-inspired conception of the axiomatic method. A concept may show up to be that
fruitful in different areas of mathematics, that it deserves seperate treatment. Algebraic
notions seem to be of this kind: the concept of group for instance turned out to be that
useful in such different fields as combinatorics, geometry and number theory that an
independent study of it was considered to be fruitful. This pattern is quite general: a
bunch of structural properties show up in different areas of mathematics and are singled
out as objects of an independent investigation. Of course, as the discussion in the first
section should have made clear, Frege does not believe that this kind of practice of sorting
been mentioned earlier, every theory of syntax includes a basic theory of arithmetic. As a strenghtening of the
downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem by Hilbert-Bernays shows, the only interpretations we have to consider
are interpretations where the domain is the set of natural numbers and the interpretations of the non-logical
vocabulary are definable sets (sets of Tupels etc.) of natural numbers. A related point has been made by Resnik
in his classic [35] with an eye to Quine’s substitutional account of logical truth.
137Note that, if this theory is too weak, it might happen that we cannot find a translation witnessing the
existential claim Trans, altough it might be possible to find such a translation in a stronger theory.
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out structural properties has anything to to with axiomatization properly so called. One
might call the properties a structure has to have in order to fall under concept group,
“axioms”; yet, on the Fregean view, genuine axioms are something quite different.
Still, some of the reasons for axiomatizing some part of discourse, and in particular
some part of metatheoretical discourse, are the same on both conceptions of the axiomatic
method. Let’s look at some of them.
Axiomatization has, for different reasons, been used as a tool for providing a frame-
work to prove things about notions that apparently are undefinable (or undefinable in
a uniform way) by means of more standard notions. One might look for instance at
Go¨del, who once considered to axiomatize the concept of computability in order to decide
the notorious Church-Turing thesis.138 The problem here is of course that one wants to
relate an exact notion (f.i. Turing-computability) with the informal notion of computabil-
ity. Altough axiomatization did not quite work out in this particular case, the rationale
behind this move seems to me important and relevant also as a possible motivation for
Frege’s suggestion to prove independence within an axiomatic setting: axiomatization can
sometimes provide a framework where hitherto undecidable statements (for instance due
to lack of precision) turn out to be provable or refutable. (Compare this situation with
Zermelos motivation behind his axiomatization of set theory, which was just to set the
stage to prove the well-ordering theorem.)
Another example of an undefinable concept, without being ambigous or vague (at least
in this particular context), is provided by the concept of truth for some given formalized
language. One of Tarski’s main conclusions at the end of his 1933 paper was that truth
can be defined unambigously for (what he calls) languages of finite order whereas no such
definition would be possible for the languages of infinite order. He remarks though that
“even with respect to formalized languages of infinite order, the consistent and correct
use of the concept of truth is rendered possible by including this concept in the system
of primitive concepts of the metalanguage and determining its fundamental properties by
means of the axiomatic method.”139 So Tarski (at this point) figured that the concept of
truth was not capable of being defined in a uniform way for any given formalized language.
138See [16] for further discussion.
139See his classic [43] p.266
93
But, according to him, this should not prevent us from investigating the concept of truth
by means of an adequate axiomatization.
A similar example is provided by Myhills suggestion to axiomatize the notion of absolute
(arithmetical) provability.140 Myhills key idea is rather simple: take some formalized
arithmetical theory T as a starting point. By Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem there
is some canonical “Go¨del-sentence” G which is neither provable nor refutable from the
axioms of T . Still, one can show this very sentence to be true by means of “standard-
reasoning”. Hence G is – in a fairly natural sense – provable after all. Now take T ′ to be
T ∪{G}: T ′ trivially proves G, yet T ′ will again contain some Go¨del-sentence G′, which is
neither provable nor refutable from T ′. But again, one can show this sentence to be true,
hence G′ is a provable arithmetical sentence. Take T ′′ to be ... What’s important here is
to notice that each of the arguments establishing the truth of G, G′, etc. should count as a
proof, though not a proof in a particular arithmetical system. On the other hand, on this
conception, arithmetical provability does not reduce to arithmetical truth either, for there
is a clear sense in which each of the G’s is established by using inferences. Myhill then
concludes that one should axiomatize the notion of absolute arithmetical provability, for
there is no way to reduce it uniformly by reference to some fixed system T of arithmetic.
The reasons for resorting to axiomatization have of course their own, specific (and often
technical) background, but I think two major motives for axiomatization can be extracted
from the discussion so far, which seem to be relevant to Frege’s proposal concerning
independence proofs:
1. axiomatization may enable one to investigate concepts that are not reducible to known
concepts
2. axiomatization may enable one to prove things that were hitherto neither provable
nor refutable
Let’s look at the first motive more closely. Recall, that on the suggested reconstruction
of Frege’s approach to independence proofs, three (purportedly primitive) notational de-
vices were introduced: the truth predicate T (x), a provability relation Prv(x, y) and, due
to Frege’s seemingly idiosyncratic conviction that thoughts are the bearers of truth and
140See his [31].
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provability, a notation for senses. Now the first question that comes to mind seems to be
the following: why take these particular notions as primitives and not others? Well, I have
no good answer to this question, for there is simply not enough evidence to assess it. Talk
about thoughts and the truth predicate clearly seem to suggest themselves as irreducible
on any reasonable account (from the Fregean point of view) of “reducibility”,141 but the
case of the provability relation Prv(x, y) seems to be less clear. The reason is this: as we
have seen, a theory of syntax as well as a theory of sense has to be included in Frege’s
new science anyways, for otherwise his translation-based method of proving independence
would not get off the ground. But given our assumption that the extension of the relation
Prv(x, y) is fixed by the syntactically defined system K, this implies that it might be
possible to define the objectlinguistic expression Prv(x, y) (applying to thoughts), given
enough facts regarding syntax and senses.
It seems to me that this line of reasoning would be quite cogent to Frege, but I leave it
to the reader to assess this question (and maybe take it as a reductio of the assumption
that derivability in K fixes the extension of Prv(x, y)). Anyways, I don’t want to push
this line of reasoning any further, because what seems to me important is Frege’s apparent
conviction that something is involved in independence proofs that is not straightforwardly
reducible to standard logico-mathematical notions (like sets, functions, numbers, points,
etc.) and that this “something” has to do with the semantic ascent that independence
proofs concerning genuine axioms require.
141Note that “reducibility” should, in the given context, not be reconstructed by appeal to interpretability
(or something akin to interpretability) alone. Geometry for instance is straightforwardly interpretable in the
theory of real numbers. Still, from the Fregean point of view, analysis belongs to logic, whereas geometry is the
paradigm-example of a theory that is not reducible to logic. Reducability carries with it, for Frege, always some
epistemological constraints, that is: a reduction of some part of discourse to some other part of discourse is given
if it can be shown how knowledge regarding the former domain can be obtained through knowledge regarding the
latter. Frege, at one point, regarded his logicist reduction as successful because he thought his reduction could
explain how knowledge of the arithmetical truths could be gained through (purportedly) logical reasoning alone.
It is in this sense that it seems to me that the basic laws of the new science are not (at least not straightforwardly)
reducible to logic alone because the new science requires basic truths about syntax and thougths, the knowledge
of which does not seem to stem from what Frege calls the “logical source of knowledge”. Knowledge of the syntax
and semantics of some given language (formal or otherwise) belongs to a quite different area which seems to be
closer to linguistics than pure logic.
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With regards to the second motive mentioned earlier (i.e. that axiomatization can pro-
vide a framework where hitherto undecidable propositions become provable or refutable)
we can see that it is dependent on the first motive, for if there is something conceptually
irreducible to independence proofs, then truths about these irreducible notions have to
be taken as axioms outright. If talk about thoughts for instance is irreducible to talk
about more “standard” logico-mathematical objects, and if some truths about thoughts
are needed in order to prove some theorem, then truths about thoughts have to be taken
as axioms. Underlying all of this is the more or less tacit conviction, that we should be
able to prove things about metatheoretical notions like truth and proof. Hence, Frege’s
Begriffsschrift-standard of proof, together with his apparent conviction that something
conceptually irreducible is involved in independence proofs, forces him to treat indepen-
dence proofs in an axiomatic fashion.142
There is another important connection to modern mathematical logic which deserves
closer attention. In their important book Undecidable Theories ([44]), Tarski, Mostowski
& Robinson introduced the notion of relative interpretability, which is defined in terms
of syntactic translations143. Here, a syntactic translation from a language L1 into a
language L2 is a pair (δ(x), t) consisting of an L2-formula δ(x) (a “domain-formula”) and
an effectively computable function t which maps every primitive n-ary predicate P of
L1 to some L2-formula φP (x1, ...xn), such that the extension of t to all formulas of L1
respects the logical constants, i.e.
1. For every primitive predicate P in L1 there is some L2-formula φP , s.t. t(P (x1, ...xn)) =
φP (x1, ...xn)
2. t(s1 = s2) = t(s1) = t(s2) for terms s1, s2
3. t(¬φ) = ¬t(φ) for every formula φ
4. t(φ→ ψ) = t(φ)→ t(ψ) for formulas φ, ψ
142As an interesting aside another peculiarity should be pointed out: it has been argued (for instance by Richard
Heck in his [19]), that some of Frege’s remarks in his Basic Laws of Arithmetic should count as “informal proofs”
of the soundness of his formulation of logic. Now this reading becomes doubtful in the light of Frege’s 1906-paper
on the foundations of geometry, where it seems that he wants to take some kind of “soundness principle” (NS1
above) as an axiom of the new science.
143For a thourough treatment of relative interpretability, compare [30].96
5. t(∀xφ) = ∀x(δ(x)→ φ) for formulas φ
An L1-theory T1 is then said to be relatively interpretable in an L2-theory T2 if there
is a syntactic translation from L1 to L2, such that for any L1-sentence φ we have
(NS ′2) T1 ` φ⇒ T2 ` t(φ)
That is, a theory T1 is relatively interpretable in T2 if every translation of a T1-theorem
is a T2-theorem. Note that the notion of a syntactic translation as described here is just
a syntactic counterpart of the notion of an interpretation (or a model). An interpretation
for some language L1 is usualy conceived of as a pair (D, I) consisting of some nonempty
set D and an interpretation function I, which assigns extensional meanings (defined over
the domain D) to the non-logical vocabulary of L1. A syntactic translation on the other
hand does something similar: it provides a “domain” for the theory T1 relative to some
theory T2 by the domain-predicate δ(x) (which should be T2-provably non-empty just like
the domain D of an interpretation should be non-empty) and it provides “interpretations”
for the primitives of L1, again, relative to the “background-theory” T2 (and, of course,
relative to the “domain” specified by δ(x)).144
Now, how can we prove the independence of some axiom φ from some L1-theory T1 by
invoking the notion of relative interpretability? Well, just find some consistent L2-theory
T2, in which T1 ∪ {¬φ} is relatively interpretable and a consistent L′2-theory T ′2 in which
T1 ∪ {φ} is relatively interpretable! If T1 ∪ {¬φ} is relatively interpretable in T2, then
T2 ` t(¬φ), i.e. T2 ` ¬t(φ). So if φ were provable from T1, then (because T2 interprets
T1) t(φ) were provable from T2, hence t(φ) ∧ ¬t(φ) were provable from T2, contradicting
the assumed consistency of T2. Similarily if T1 ∪ {φ} is relatively interpretable in T ′2 then
¬φ cannot be provable from T1 either.
Now obviously the notion of syntactic translation as defined above is (nearly) exactly
what Frege seems to have in mind when he is elucidating his new basic law.145 As we have
seen, F -translations serve only the intermediate-purpose of providing functions mapping
144In a sense, models/interpretations can even be regarded as special cases of syntactic translations, viz. inter-
pretations where the interpreting theory T2 is some standard set theory.
145To be more precise, it is exactly the Fregean notion of translation if unrestricted quantifiers are used. As
we have seen, the Fregean translation of a universally quantified sentence ∀xφ would be ∀xt(φ), whereas on the
modern conception of a translation one would have to restrict the quantifier to some domain-predicate δ(x).
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senses of expressions to senses expressions, for Frege considered thoughts to be kind of
things we should be interested in when dealing with the question of independence. On
the other hand, on Frege’s account, those functions mapping senses to senses are parasitic
on the corresponding syntactic functions mapping expressions to expressions. So in a
sense the often heard complaint that Frege did not think in semantic (model-theoretic)
terms but rather syntactically is both true and false (at least applying to the question at
hand): it is true in the sense that 1. his translation-based method relies on “syntactical
methods”, i.e. syntactical objects (“words”) stand at the center of his method and 2.
informal independence arguments must be made explicit in order to count as genuine
proofs. On the other hand, his approach is clearly model-theoretic in spirit, for again,
translations are just “syntactified” models. Frege’s method could then even be glossed in
modern terminology: to show that a genuine axiom φ is independent of axioms T1, show
that T1 ∪ {¬φ} is relatively interpretable in a true theory T2 (the truth of T2 of course
implies T2’s consistency).
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The philosophical payoff – from the Fregean point of view – is of course that by
invoking translation-terminology instead of (re-)interpretations Frege can give an account
of independence proofs without giving up his fixed interpretation conception of language,
i.e. his view that expressions of a language properly so called (formal or natural) come
“immutably equipped”147 with a fixed sense as well as a fixed reference which cannot be
146Recall though, that Frege does not argue like this. There is a difference between defining relative inter-
pretability as above, and by stipulating that T1 is relatively interpretable in T2 if T2 proves every translation of a
T1-axiom. To see where Frege departs from the modern approach via relative interpretability as defined in this
way, suppose we were given some true theory T2 and a translation t, such that T2 ` t(T1) and T2 ` t(¬φ), i.e.
T2 ` ¬t(φ). Now one might argue that, as T2 proves every translation of a T1-axiom, it follows informally that
T2 proves every translation of a T1-theorem. Therefore, if φ were provable from T1, its translation t(φ) would
be provable from T2. But it is precisely this kind of appeal to informality that Frege wants to eliminate in his
approach. Hence, Frege argues that by the new law NS2, if T1 ` φ, then t(T1) ` t(φ). From this, together with
the assumption T2 ` t(T1) and the transitivity of the provability-relation, we can infer that T2 ` t(φ).
Note also that on Frege’s view of axioms as true thoughts, the negation ¬φ of an axiom φ cannot be provable
from the true thoughts in T2 trivially. Speaking loosely (and anachronistically): for Frege, there is no need to
“show” that there is a model in which T2 ∪ {φ} is true in order to show that ¬φ is not provable from T2, for if
T2 ∪ {φ} are genuine axioms, they will be true in their “intended interpretation”.
147Antonelli/May in [1] p. 246
98
altered randomly (for whatever reason). In considering translations we no longer have
to “change the meanings” or something alike – we are dealing with entirely different
languages.148 Hence, by relying on translations instead of (re-)interpretations one can
in a sense emulate model-theoretic reasoning without being committed to a picture of
language that is sometimes said to be prerequisite for semantically-minded independence
proofs.
In conclusion I want to emphasize two points: first, Frege’s suggestions (in particular
in the last part of his 1906-paper) can be seen as an important step towards providing
a framework for metatheoretical investigations that is compatible with a traditional con-
ception of the “axiomatic method”. Moreover, his axiomatic approach to independence
proofs draws attention to the important observation that metatheoretical investigations
do not take place in “vacuous space” and that recourse to “informality” is not a valid
alternative either. Metatheoretical investigations have commitments too, and if done
responsibly, one has to make plain what these commitments are.
Second, as I have tried to make plausible, the axiomatic way Frege approaches the
question of independence is a direct ancestor of axiomatic approaches to metatheoretical
concepts in 20th century logic, in particular attempts to axiomatize the concept of truth.
Furthermore, some of the concepts employed by Frege have direct counterparts in modern
logic (such as the notion of a translation). So although Frege’s suggestions in his 1906-
paper are rather sketchy, they nonetheless provide connections to important areas of 20th
century mathematical and philosophical logic. And even though Frege does things quite
differently from what we are used to from our modern logic textbooks, it still seems to be
justified to raise the counterfactual question “What could a careful thinker like Frege have
achieved, had he spent more effort in spelling out the details?” and answer it immediately:
quite a lot.
148Note also, that there is a reading of Hilbert’s independence proofs which takes it that Hilbert too had in fact
translations in mind (rather than “reinterpretations”). See [18] for more on that issue.
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4 Remarks on Compositionality and Weak Axiomatic Theories
of Truth
Abstract.149 The paper draws attention to an important, but apparently ne-
glected distinction relating to axiomatic theories of truth, viz. the distinction
between weakly and strongly truth-compositional theories of truth. The paper
argues that the distinction might be helpful in classifying weak axiomatic the-
ories of truth and examines some of them with respect to it.
The point I want to adress in this short note is concerned with an important, but
apparently unnoticed distinction relating to weak axiomatic theories of truth, which have
come to the fore in formal philosophy recently.
To motivate my point, recall that one of the problems that plagues the axiomatic theory
of truth DT is the so called generalization problem. DT (sometimes labelled TB) ist the
axiomatic theory of truth that consists solely of the instances of the so called restricted
T -scheme:
(T ) T (φ)↔ φ
(T ) is an axiom-scheme, i.e. one get’s a particular instance of this scheme by replacing
φ with a particular well-formed sentence of the base language (which, as it is customary in
discussing axiomatic theories of truth, will be the language LPA of arithmetic throughout
this paper)150. The problem has already been mentioned in Tarski’s seminal paper The
Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages as early as 1933:
A theory of truth founded on them [the T -Biconditionals; author] would be
a highly incomplete system, which would lack the most important and most
fruitful general theorems. Let us show this in more detail by a concrete ex-
ample. Consider the sentential function ‘x∈¯Tr or x¯∈¯Tr’. If in this function
149This paper has been submitted for publication in Journal of Philosophical Logic. Date of submission: 2nd
July 2012.
150In order to avoid paradox one has to restrict the T -scheme in one way or the other. This can be done by
restricting the metavariable φ in (T ) to sentences not containing the truth-predicate.
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we substitute for the variable ‘x’ structural-descriptive names of sentences, we
obtain an infinite number of theorems, the proof of which on the basis of the
axioms obtained from the convention T presents not the slightest difficulty. But
the situation changes fundamentally as soon as we pass to the generalization of
this sentential function, i.e. to the general principle of contradiction. From the
intuitive standpoint the truth of all those theorems is itself already a proof of
the general principle; this principle represents, so to speak, an ‘infinite logical
product’ of those special theorems. But this does not at all mean that we can
actually derive the principle of contradiction from the axioms or theorems men-
tioned by means of the normal modes of inference usually employed. On the
contrary, by a slight modification of Th. III it can be shown that the principle
of contradiction is not a consequence (at least in the existing sense of the word)
of the axiom system described. ([7] p. 257)
To repeat his point: the problem is that, even though every instance of the scheme
(PCS) ∼ T (φ)∨ ∼ T (∼ φ)
is derivable from DT , the corresponding universally quantified statement
(PC) ∀φ ∈ LPA :∼ T (φ)∨ ∼ T (∼ φ)
is not.
Tarski concludes from this that an axiomatic theory of truth based exclusively on the
T -Biconditionals (i.e. ‘Convention T ’) cannot claim to be a satisfactory theory of truth.
For Tarski, the derivability of the T -Biconditionals remains a minimal adequacy condition,
but, as can be seen from the quote above, the derivability of the T -Biconditionals alone is
not sufficient to warrant the adequacy of a theory of truth. More recently, Paul Horwich’s
minimalist theory of truth, which can be seen as a variant of DT if properly axiomatized,
has been attacked for – among other things – a similar reason. Not being able to prove
certain general statements concerning the truth predicate is therefore a major problem
any weak theory of truth such as DT has to face.
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One of the unfortunate consequences of the generalization problem is that on the basis
of the T -Biconditionals alone it is not possible to prove certain facts about the truth
predicate which are often taken to be central to the concept of truth (and semantics
in general), namely that truth is compositional. Recall that the intuitive principle of
compositionality is usually taken to consist in something like the following:
For every complex expression e of some language L, the semantic value of e in L
is determined by the syntactical mode of composition of e and the semantic values
of the constituents of e in L.
Hence compositionality is, on the most natural reading of this principle, expressed by
a sentence quantifying explicitly over expressions of some given language L (or in our case
Go¨del numbers of expressions). In the context of classical, typed axiomatic theories of
truth the semantic values we are interested in primarily, are of course truth and falsity,
and the modes of composition we have to consider for our arithmetical base language
are identity of terms (the terms being composed of a constant 0, addition-, times- and
the successor function), negation, conjunction and universal quantification. An axiomatic
theory of truth is then said to be compositional, if – following the intuitive principle just
sketched – the following universally quantified statements are provable151:
TC1 ∀φ ∈ LatomPA : T (φ)↔ T0(φ)
TC2 ∀φ ∈ LPA : T (∼ φ)↔∼ T (φ)
TC3 ∀φ∀ψ ∈ LPA : T (φ&ψ)↔ T (φ)&T (ψ)
TC4 ∀φ(y) ∈ LPA : T (∀xφ(x))↔ ∀xT (φ(x))
151In the following LatomPA stands for the class of atomic arithmetical sentences (i.e. equations) and T0(x) for the
truth-predicate restricted to atomic sentences, which is definable in PA and for which Tarski’s ‘Convention T ’ can
be shown to be satisfied in PA. Note also that ∀xT (φ(x) is to be understood as ∀xT ( ˙sub(n,m, n˙u(x))), where n
is the Go¨delnumber of the formula φ(x), m is the go¨delnumber of the variable x, n˙u(x) is the function mapping
every natural number to the Go¨delnumber of it’s numeral and sub(x, y, z) is the substitution function. Similar
conventions apply to occurences of the negation- and conjunction sign within the scope of the truth predicate.
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If these clauses are taken as axioms, what we get is a theory called TC (sometimes
CT or T (PA)), one of the most studied theories of truth there is. Indeed, TC1 − TC4
are just the clauses Tarski used in his recursive definition of truth.152 The compositional
clauses also play a prominent role in Davidson’s philosophy of language (see for instance
his [1]).
Because of the generalization problem, DT does not prove any of these quantified
statements and hence DT cannot be taken to capture compositionality in a full-blooded
sense.153
DT however does prove something that looks very similar to these clauses: DT proves
every instance of the schemes corresponding to the quantified sentences TC1, TC2 and
TC3, that is, DT proves every arithmetical instance of the schemes
TCS1 T (φ)↔ T0(φ) (for φ atomic)
TCS2 T (∼ φ)↔∼ T (φ)
TCS3 T (φ&ψ)↔ T (φ)&T (ψ)
This can be seen very easily:
TCS1: this is obvious, for even PA alone proves T0(φ) ↔ φ for every atomic
sentence φ.
152This is strictly speaking not true, for Tarski defined the more general notion of satisfaction recursively in
order to define the concept of truth.
153We just look at the negation-case: Assume DT ` ∀φ ∈ LPA :∼ T (φ)↔ T (∼ φ); Now a proof of this statement
can use only finitely many axioms DT0 of DT , i.e. DT0 ` ∀φ ∈ LPA :∼ T (φ) ↔ T (∼ φ). Let T (φ1) ↔ φ1, ....
T (φn)↔ φn be a complete list of the T -Biconditionals used in the proof. Now define a model (N, ET ) (based on
the standard-model of arithmetic N) by including all (codes of) true sentences φi and the negations of all false
sentences φi (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n) into the extension ET of the truth predicate. Then (N, ET ) makes all arithmetical
axioms used in the proof true as well as all the T -Biconditionals. But in this model the quantified sentence
∀φ ∈ LPA :∼ T (φ) ↔ T (∼ φ) is clearly false. Hence DT0 2 ∀φ ∈ LPA :∼ T (φ) ↔ T (∼ φ) and therefore
DT0 0 ∀φ ∈ LPA :∼ T (φ)↔ T (∼ φ). Contradiction.
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TCS2: One instance of the T -Schema of DT is given by T (∼ φ)↔∼ φ, another
one by T (φ)↔ φ, which is equivalent to ∼ T (φ)↔∼ φ. Putting these biconditionals
together yields T (∼ φ)↔∼ T (φ) as desired.
TCS3: Similarily, for each pair of LPA-sentences φ, ψ the following are instances
of the T -schema: T (φ&ψ)↔ φ&ψ, T (φ)↔ φ and T (ψ)↔ ψ. Again, putting these
together yields T (φ&ψ)↔ T (φ)&T (ψ).

Hence, one might hope that DT proves at least something akin to compositionality,
namely, for every quantified statement TC1 - TC4 it’s corresponding scheme. As Horsten,
in his recent book The Tarskian Turn claims:
It is important that each compositional truth axiom is expressed as a universally
quantified sentence rather than as an axiom scheme. From the axiom scheme,
the corresponding universally quantified sentence cannot be derived. But we
have seen that each instance can be derived from DT , whereby the schematic
version of TC is a consequence of DT . ([2]: 71; also to be found in [3]: 364)
However, this last claim is mistaken, for as can be seen, DT does not even prove
(every instance of) the scheme corresponding to the quantifier clause TC4, i.e.: for every
LPA-formula φ(x) with exactly x free
TCS4 T (∀xφ(x))↔ ∀xT (φ(x))
Here is the short argument (which is similar to the argument establishing the non-
provability of TC2 from DT )
154:
Let φ(x) ∈ LPA be some formula for which we have N  ∀xφ(x) (take for instance
the formula x = x). Now suppose DT ` T (∀xφ(x)) ↔ ∀xT (φ(x)). Again, because
a proof can only use finitely many axioms, there must be some finite subset DT0 of
DT , such that DT0 ` T (∀xφ(x))↔ ∀xT (φ(x)). Let
154I do not want to suggest that Horsten and Halbach are not aware of this fact. But it seems to me that they
underestimate the significance of this point.
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T (φ1)↔ φ1
....
T (φn)↔ φn
be a list of all the T -Biconditionals in DT0: We will now construct a model
(N, ET ), in which all these T -Biconditionals are true, but T (∀xφ(x))↔ ∀xT (φ(x)) is
not. This is done by including all true sentences φi, every negation of a false sentence
φi (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n) as well as ∀xφ(x) into the extension of the truth-predicate. In
this model T (∀xφ(x)) is true, as is every instance of the T -schema listed above. But
the universally quantified sentence ∀xT (φ(x)) is false, because for this statement
to be true, ET would have to contain every numerical instance φ(0), φ(1), φ(2), ...,
for this is exactly what ∀xT (φ(x)) says. But, by definition, ET is finite. Hence
DT0 2 T (∀xφ(x)) ↔ ∀xT (φ(x)) and therefore DT0 0 T (∀xφ(x)) ↔ ∀xT (φ(x)).
Contradiction.

Hence, DT does not capture a central feature of truth: that a universally quantified
sentence is true if and only if all its instances are true, and it does so not even for the
weak schematic form of this compositional clause. Although the compositional character
of truth is somehow reflected in the case of the propositional connectives, the possibility
of quantifying into the truth predicate is not reflected by the axioms of DT , which only
apply to whole sentences. In a sense, the possibility to quantify into the truth predicate
outstrips the proof-theoretical power of DT , i.e. DT cannot relate the truth of a quantified
sentence to its numerical instances.
This motivates a weakening of the intuitive compositional principle, which, in the con-
text of axiomatic theories of truth, takes the form of the requirement that every instance
of the schemes TCS1 − TCS4 be derivable. A truth theory S satisfying this condition
will be called weakly truth compositional (wtc for short) henceforth. By contrast, a the-
ory may be called strongly truth-compositional (stc for short) if the quantified statements
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TC1− TC4 are derivable.155
I think being wtc is a desirable property of a weak theory of truth, for a theory
satisfying this condition makes plain the point of the principle of compositionality, which
does not lie in the quantifiers used to formulate it, but in the following: that the truth
value of a complex sentence depends on its syntactical structure and the truth values of
its sub-sentences (or as it is sometimes expressed: that truth ‘distributes’ over the logical
operators), and this is arguably captured by the schemes as well.
One may compare the situation with the case of the principle of induction in arithmetic:
straightforwardly, the principle of induction is expressed by a single sentence ∀X(X(0) ∧
∀x(X(x)→ X(S(x)))→ ∀xX(x)) quantifying over sets of natural numbers. In standard
first-order arithmetic, however, only quantification over natural numbers, not sets of
natural numbers, is possible. Hence the best we can get in first-order arithmetic is the
scheme φ(0)∧∀x(φ(x)→ φ(S(x)))→ ∀xφ(x) corresponding to the full-blooded principle
of induction expressed by the quantified second-order (or set-theoretical) sentence. True:
the induction-scheme does not capture the intuitive principle of induction completely,
but only few would claim that the point of the principle of induction would be lost by
weakening the full-scale principle of induction to the scheme. It seems to me that this
situation is – at least in the main respects – analogous to the case of the principle of
compositionality.
Now the question which immediately arises is: are there any interesting wtc theories
of truth that are not stc? (Of course every stc-theorey is also wtc.)156
155A semantic theory may be called strictly compositional or simply compositional, if analogue conditions for the
satisfaction relation Sat(x, y) are derivable. Note also that although in this paper attention is restricted to typed
theories of truth, there is no reason not to apply the distinction between wtc and stc theories of truth to untyped
theories of truth as well.
156The theory comprising of DT plus all instances of the schema TCS4 seems to be all too ad hoc to count as a
well-motivated ‘interesting’ theory of truth.
Note also, that it does not seem to be a trivial matter if the theory consisting of the schemes corresponding to
TC1 - TC4, call it TCS , is ‘interesting’. The problem with TCS is that it is not obvious if it proves every instance
of the T -scheme, thereby meeting Convention T . Call the schematic theory one gets from TCS by allowing free
variables to occur in its instances TCPS . Clearly TC
P
S proves every instance of the T -scheme T (φ)↔ φ. This can be
shown by proving the stronger claim that from TCPS every instance of the uniform T -scheme ∀x(T (φ(x)↔ φ(x)),
is derivable. This is proved by a straightforward induction on the complexity of φ(x). But it is not clear if this
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As we have seen, DT fails to be wtc, for not every instance of TCS4 is provable from
DT . We do, however, get an interesting wtc theory of truth by slightly improving on
DT . The axioms of this improved theory, which will be referred to as UDT (sometimes
labelled UTB) and which is well known in the literature, consists in all instances of the
schema:
(UT ) ∀x(T (φ(x))↔ φ(x))
(UT ) is a scheme with respect to formulas, not sentences, i.e. we get a particular
instance of this scheme by inserting a particular formula φ(x) ∈ LPA with exactly the
variable x free. UDT is an interesting theory of truth to the extent that it meets the
minimal requirement of proving all instances of the T -scheme, for DT is obviously a
subtheory of UDT . Moreover, it is immediate that UDT is wtc too, because from (UT )
it follows that every instance of the follwing scheme is provable:
∀xT (φ(x))↔ ∀xφ(x)
which, together with the relevant instances of the scheme T (∀xφ(x))↔ ∀xφ(x) (which
are already provable from DT ), yields, as desired, every instance of the schema TCS4.
So it seems that a case can be made for UDT as an attractive weak theory of truth,
for it meets certain requirements that are sometimes considered necessary conditions for
a theory of truth to be ‘good’. In particular, UDT – being a supertheory of DT – is
minimally adequate in the sense that it meets Convention T . Second, it is a conservative
extension of the base theory PA, that is, it does not prove any new non-semantical facts
(i.e. sentences not containing the truth predicate).157 Also, conceptually, UDT is only a
slight modification of and hence nearly as simple and elegant as DT . One might even say
that someone who takes DT as his favourite theory of truth is thereby commited to UDT
as well. After all, if a formula contains free variables, these may be regarded as names of
can be done for TCS , where only sentences are allowed to occur in the axiom schemes TC1 - TC3.
157It has been argued by Shapiro in his [6] and Ketland in his [5] that an adequate deflationist theory of truth
is bound to conservativity.
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arbitrary objects of the intended domain. So if one is inclined to accept T (φ(a))↔ φ(a),
a being a name of an arbitrary object (as is the case if one accepts DT ), one should
also accept ∀x(T (φ(x))↔ φ(x)). Thus, in the light of it’s conceptual similarity to DT it
might even seem surprising that, unlike DT , UDT can claim to be compositional (in the
sense of being wtc).
So it seems to me that it is worth further investigating wtc theories of truth, for it
is often not a trivial matter whether a given minimally adequate theory of truth (in the
sense of satisfying Convention T ) is wtc.
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5 Abstract (German)
Mit einigem Recht kann man sagen, dass sich moderne, formale Logik so gut wie auss-
chließlich mit metatheoretischen Aspekten formal-logischer Sprachen und mit Hilfe solcher
Sprachen formulierter axiomatischer Theorien, bescha¨ftigt. Metatheoretische Probleme
wie Korrektheit, Vollsta¨ndigkeit oder Entscheidbarkeit oder Fragen bzgl. Konsistenz oder
Unabha¨ngigkeit axiomatisierter Theorien, stehen im Zentrum des Interesses. Obwohl
Frege einer der Hauptbegru¨nder der modernen Logik war, hat sich in den letzten Jahrzehn-
ten eine lebhafte Debatte u¨ber die Frage entwickelt, ob und inwieweit Frege u¨berhaupt
in der Lage war, sich derartige Fragen zu stellen. Einer einflussreichen Tradition zufolge
wu¨rde Freges “universalistisches” Versta¨ndnis von Logik eine genuin metatheoretische
Perspektive na¨mlich verhindern. Im Zuge dieser Debatte kam es in ju¨ngerer Zeit zu einer
Neubewertung von Freges Verha¨ltnis zu Unabha¨ngigkeits- und Konsistenzbeweisen bzgl.
axiomatisierter Theorien. Zentral in dieser Diskussion ist die sogenannte “Frege-Hilbert-
Kontroverse”, ein wissenschaftlicher Streit u¨ber den Status der “axiomatischen Methode”
zwischen Frege und dem Mathematiker und Logiker David Hilbert. Die in dieser Dis-
sertation gesammelten Aufsa¨tze sind als Beitrag zur Aufarbeitung dieser Kontroverse
gedacht und bescha¨ftigen sich in der Hauptsache mit Freges eigenem Versta¨ndnis von
Unabha¨ngigkeit und Konsistenz. Die Artikel beziehen sich gro¨ßtenteils auf Freges eigenen
Ansatz zu Unabha¨ngigkeitsbeweisen, den er in seinem 1906 vero¨ffentlichten Aufsatz U¨ber
die Grundlagen der Geometrie pra¨sentiert. Freges Vorschlag besteht im Wesentlichen
darin, eine “neue Wissenschaft” zu etablieren, innerhalb derer Fragen wie Unabha¨ngigkeit
von Axiomen verhandelt werden sollen.
Der erste Aufsatz “Remarks on Independence Proofs and Indirect Reference” bescha¨ftigt
sich mit einem bestimmten interpretatorischen Problem bezu¨glich Freges “neuer Wis-
senschaft”, das sich aus seiner Festlegung ergibt, dass Axiome eine bestimmte Art inten-
sionaler Entita¨ten (“Gedanken”) sind. Der zweite Aufsatz, “Frege’s On the Foundations
of Geometry and Axiomatic Metatheory”, der den Kern dieser Dissertation ausmacht,
bescha¨ftigt sich eingehend mit der Frage, wie Freges “neue Wissenschaft” genauer rekon-
struiert werden ko¨nnte. Ich werde dort zum Schluss kommen, dass Freges Gedanken zur
“neuen Wissenschaft” einige auffallende Bezu¨ge zur modernen Bescha¨ftigung mit axioma-
tischer Metatheorie, insbesondere axiomatischen Theorien der Wahrheit, aufweisen. Der
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letzte Aufsatz “Remarks on Compositionality and Weak Axiomatic Theories of Truth”
bescha¨ftigt sich mit einem konkreten (teils technischen, teils philosophischen) Problem
schwacher axiomatischer Wahrheitstheorien und ist als Beitrag zur aktuellen Debatte
gedacht.
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